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ABSTRACT 
 
Although experiments are the gold standard for establishing causality, several threats can undermine 
the internal validity of experimental findings. In this article, we first discuss these threats, which 
include the lack of consequential decisions and outcomes, deception, demand effects and unfair 
comparisons, as well as issues concerning statistical validity (e.g., minimum sample size per cell, 
estimating variance correctly). We expose each problem, show potential solutions, and bring to the fore 
issues of relevance of the findings (i.e., external and ecological validity). Thereafter, we take stock of 
the state-of-the-science regarding validity threats using a representative sample of 468 recent 
experiments from 258 articles published in top-tier journals. We compare research practices in three 
fields of study—management, social psychology, and economics, which regularly use experimental 
research—to operations management, which has recently begun to use the experimental paradigm. Our 
results underscore the importance for journals and authors to follow what we identify to be best-
practice methodological suggestions (i.e., the “ten commandments” of experimental research). We 
show that—on average—markers of methodological rigor and generalizability positively and 
significantly predict the citations received by published articles. Finally, given that experiments are 
infeasible in some settings, we conclude with a brief review of often overlooked quasi-experimental 
designs, which are useful for generating strong counterfactuals and hence allow making causal claims 
in the field.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Experimental methods; Research methods; Research impact; Causality; Endogeneity; 
Quasi-experimentation.
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“If … [a new law] disagrees with experiment … [the law] is wrong. In that simple statement is 
the key to science. It does not make any difference how beautiful your guess is. It does not make 
any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is—if … [the law] 
disagrees with experiment it is wrong. That is all there is to it.” – Richard Phillips (Feynman, 
1965, p. 165), Nobel Prize laureate in Physics in 1965 
1. INTRODUCTION 
How should experiments be made valid, realistic, and relevant? This question is important 
to answer given the prominence of experimental research in the applied sciences. Since the end of 
the 1980s, experimental methods became a common tool to understanding behavioral aspects of 
decision making in the operations management (OM) discipline (Bendoly, Donohue, & Schultz, 
2006). The use of experimental methods in this field has continued to grow and behavioral 
experiments are currently present in many top tier outlets (e.g., see the most recent special issues 
on experimental and behavioral OM research, Croson, Schultz, Siemsen, & Yeo, 2013; Gans & 
Croson, 2008). Are these experiments well done and do they add any useful knowledge beyond 
other methods?  
The answers to the above questions are not evident; nor are there explicit standards that 
authors can turn to for judging the quality of experimental research in this field. In this article, we 
aim to provide researchers with guidance on how to conduct useful experimental research in the 
organizational sciences. This endeavor is not immune to difficulties, because different fields have 
different viewpoints about experimental methodology (see, e.g., Ariely & Norton, 2007; Hertwig 
& Ortmann, 2001; Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002). These discrepancies can be especially problematic 
for organizational scholars, given the multidisciplinary nature of their field and the lack of unified 
theories, methods, and assumptions (Antonakis, 2017; Gino & Pisano, 2008; Pfeffer, 1993). This 
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fragmentation is also visible in behavioral OM, which initially covered themes and employed 
methods coming from the experimental economics tradition (newsvendor game and auctions, see, 
e.g., Croson & Donohue, 2002; Katok, 2011; Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000); however, with time 
behavioral approaches to OM have embraced psychological and sociological viewpoints and now 
includes topics as diverse as groupthink (Riccobono, Bruccoleri, & Größler, 2015), cross-cultural 
differences (Cannon, Doney, Mullen, & Petersen, 2010; Naor, Linderman, & Schroeder, 2010; 
Ribbink & Grimm, 2014), trust and trustworthiness (Özer, Zheng, & Chen, 2011; Özer, Zheng, & 
Ren, 2014), fairness concerns (Katok, Olsen, & Pavlov, 2014; Katok & Pavlov, 2013) and 
linkages between intrinsic motivation and job design (De Treville & Antonakis, 2006; Rodríguez, 
Buyens, Landeghem, & Lasio, 2016). 
In this article we develop methodological guidelines that strike a balance between diverse 
methodological traditions and hence speak to a wide range of social scientists. Our contribution is 
unique vis-à-vis articles that have already discussed experimental and behavioral OM research at 
length (e.g., Bendoly, Croson, Goncalves, & Schultz, 2010; Bendoly et al., 2006; Gino & Pisano, 
2008). We review existing pros and cons for different experimental practices, highlighting trade-
offs between different choices, and take a clear position where norms across diverse academic 
fields diverge. Our end product is a synthesis of best-practices into a uniform methodological 
paradigm that can help guide future experimental work. 
Our methodological guidelines are tailored to the needs of OM scholars; however, they 
equally apply to organizational fields that were traditionally reluctant to use experimental 
methods and are now calling for more experimental research (Antonakis, 2017; Chatterji, 
Findley, Jensen, Meier, & Nielson, 2016; Colquitt, 2008; Eden, 2017; P. M. Podsakoff & 
Podsakoff, 2018). Our synopsis is relevant too for non-experimentalists, because increasing 
methodological concerns have raised the bar for identifying causally interpretable results in 
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studies using observational field data in recent years. The issue of endogeneity, which implies 
that a modelled independent variable is correlated with the disturbance term in a regression 
model (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Wooldridge, 2015), is gaining prominence on the radars of 
reviewers and editors, both in OM (Guide & Ketokivi, 2015; Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017), in 
management, and other social sciences (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010; 
Chenhall & Moers, 2007; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Roberts & Whited, 2013; Semadeni, 
Withers, & Trevis Certo, 2014). Whereas ex-post fixes for endogeneity exist, randomized 
experiments remain the most convincing solution to the causality issue (Aguinis & Edwards, 
2014). 
Randomized experiments are, however, not a panacea (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002). Methodological issues such as deception (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Ortmann & Hertwig, 
2002), unwanted demand effects (Zizzo, 2010), small sample sizes (Button et al., 2013; Strube, 
1991) and other internal and statistical validity threats can undermine the causal knowledge we 
can gain from experimental research. Moreover, ecological (Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004; 
Highhouse, 2009) and external validity issues (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982; Guala, 2003; 
Guala & Mittone, 2005; Kessler & Vesterlund, 2015; Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017) can weaken 
the generalizability and practical relevance of experiments.  
In this review, we will discuss all these issues, show how they are oftentimes tightly 
interconnected, and identify how experiments should be done to ensure rigor but also relevance. 
To illustrate where we see room for improvement in OM experimental research, we will 
benchmark it with experimental research in three close neighbor fields: Management, social 
psychology, and economics. We document the methodological practices across fields and 
illustrate empirically that researchers have strong reasons to adopt good practices: As our results 
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will show, markers of methodological rigor and of potential generalizability predict citations of 
papers across the academic fields we reviewed. 
We structure our article as follows. We first explore the main threats to internal validity, 
differentiating between ex-ante threats (i.e., faults in the experimental design) and ex-post threats 
(i.e., incorrect statistical analysis of the data). Then we discuss the most pressing external and 
ecological validity concerns from an organizational studies viewpoint. Next, we provide a 
quantified and representative review of the existing experimental research in several social 
sciences in the past decade. Finally, we propose a toolbox of under-utilized statistical methods 
that allow researchers to mimic experimental techniques that ensure causal identification with 
field data when designing an experiment is not possible. We conclude with a summary of our 
methodological guidelines—the “ten commandments” of experimental research—and thus 
provide researchers with a portable go-to framework to make experimental research more 
rigorous and relevant. 
2. HOW TO DESIGN AN EXPERIMENT: INTERNAL VALIDITY ISSUES 
Experiments can be defined as a type of “study in which an intervention is deliberately 
introduced to observe its effects” (Shadish et al., 2002, p. 12) on one or multiple dependent 
variables. That is, the experimenter establishes that an independent variable x has a causal impact 
on a dependent variable y by manipulating x. In this way x is exogenous and varies independently 
of other causes (i.e., e, the disturbance) of y. 
However, correct causal inference requires clean manipulations and tight control over the 
experimental environment; otherwise the researchers run the risk of incurring an internal validity 
error (Campbell, 1957; Shadish et al., 2002). In experimental research, most critical internal 
validity problems arise if the treatment group and the control group differ not only in one 
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dimension, that is, the dimension of the intervention, but also in a confounding factor. At one 
extreme, when the experimental conditions are not randomly assigned, both observable and 
unobservable variables might be real causes of an observed treatment effect, because the 
unobserved variables, pooled in e, are not equally distributed across treatments. However, in most 
cases confounds are subtler and are produced by “unfair comparisons” (W. H. Cooper & 
Richardson, 1986): The constructs employed to contrast two or more theoretical propositions are 
operationalized with dissimilar care and realism and are, ultimately, not comparable. 
2.1. Demand effects 
One of the most dangerous types of unfair comparisons in experimental research is 
unwanted demand effects. Humans are inherently social and their behavior is crucially 
determined by their interpretation of the social situation they are facing (Hertwig & Ortmann, 
2001; Zizzo, 2010). Experimental subjects are no different and construct their beliefs about the 
researcher’s expectations: As a result, the subjects’ behaviors might be altered by so-called 
“demand effects” (also known as demand characteristics). These effects concern the “changes in 
behavior by experimental subjects due to cues about what constitutes appropriate behavior” 
(Zizzo, 2010, p. 75). Thus, demand effects are explicit or implicit indications present in the 
experimental situation—in the instructions of the experiment or in the experimenter’s behavior—
that can systematically bias participants’ response to a treatment. Demand effects represent a 
central problem for experimentalists as soon as the demand effects correlate with the treatment 
status. These effects create a confound because treated and untreated subjects differ not only in 
the treatment status; they differ too in the demand effects they face (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). 
There are several features of experimental settings that facilitate the emergence of 
demand effects. First, the hierarchical relationship existing between experimenter and 
6 
 
 
participants might push the subjects to naturally conform to her or his authority (see the 
pioneering studies on the natural obendience to authority of Milgram, 1963). Second, demand 
effects lie in the need for social approval and social desirability (Fisher, 1993). This issue is 
prominent in most experiments, because the behavior of participants is—at least indirectly—
observable by the experimenter and possibly by other participants. Third, some elements of the 
experimental design might be so salient that they might end up revealing the purpose of the 
experiment to participants, making the hypotheses tested apparent. For instance, if participants 
are asked either to “maximize their gains” or to “be fair and equitable” in a negotiation 
simulation, they will surely form a clear opinion of the topic studied. Demand effects may also 
occur if subjects are prompted as to what is the obvious choice in a particular context. This risk is 
maximized if subjects are exposed to all or a subset of the manipulations and asked to choose the 
most appropriate option: For example, asking subjects to choose the most appropriate looking 
wartime leader from a set of different versions of the same face, ranging from very dominant to 
very docile will very likely trigger demand effects, because it may become obvious to subjects 
what the experimenter manipulated (Bøggild & Laustsen, 2016). Lastly, strong demand effects 
might emerge if experimenters are not blind to treatments and interact directly with the 
experimental subjects. For instance, a recent replication study of the “power pose” effect (see 
Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010) has shown that the interaction between experimenter and 
participants had likely led to an inflation of the original effect sizes, contributing to the 
replication failure of the apparent effect (Ranehill et al., 2015). 
Demand effects generate unfair comparisons because they deliberately hinder one 
experimental condition in favor of another one. A clear example can be seen in the so-called 
“recall task” (e.g., Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), which is often used to study felt power 
in psychology. Treated subjects are asked to write an essay about a certain topic (e.g., “write 
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about a situation where you felt powerful”), whereas participants in the control condition write 
about a presumably neutral topic (e.g., “write about what you did yesterday”). Apparently, this 
manipulation should activate a “power prime” in treated subjects making them “feel” power. 
However, this type of treatment is problematic for two reasons. First, this power manipulation 
provides treated participants with strong clues about the purpose of the experiment (Sturm & 
Antonakis, 2015). Moreover, it provides asymmetric clues to the participants: Whereas treated 
subjects may easily see how the experimenter is trying to study power, the participants in the 
control condition can hardly form any opinion on the topic studied. As a result, the researchers 
are not comparing a “high power” group with a “no power” group, but rather a group that is also 
experiencing a strong demand effect with a group facing no demand at all. Thus, it is very 
important that researchers not only think very carefully about the implementation of the treatment 
that they are interested in, but also about the design of their control group. A correct control 
group should expose experimental subjects to a baseline level of the manipulated variable, so to 
really observe subjects’ behaviors in the absence of the treatment, yet it should hold constant any 
demand effect already present in the treatment condition (e.g., see Study 2 in Bendahan, Zehnder, 
Pralong, & Antonakis, 2015). 
A second mode of unfair comparison hinges on incorrectly specified comparisons 
between two levels of the same dependent variable. For instance, assume a researcher exposes 
subjects to a vignette describing either of two possible business scenarios. In the first treatment, a 
corporation is ostensibly described as environmentally friendly and responsible towards its 
stakeholder (“high corporate social responsibility” treatment); the second version of the vignette 
depicts the same company as environmentally damaging and irresponsible (“low corporate social 
responsibility” treatment). The researchers assess the intentions to buy from each corporation of 
the experimental subjects as dependent variable. Does contrasting these two treatments identify 
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the causal effect of corporate social responsibility on subjects’ intentions to buy? Not really. The 
researchers do not know whether any difference in the response of the experimental subjects is 
due to an aversion towards the irresponsible company, a preference for the responsible one or a 
mixture of the two explanations. Moreover, the researchers can hardly exclude whether any 
difference was triggered by two demand effects that are equally blatant, yet are of opposite 
direction. 
The perils of this type of unfair comparison cause a serious internal validity threat, yet are 
largely overlooked in the social sciences (cf. Schaerer, du Plessis, Yap, & Thau, 2018). For 
example, Crede (2018) has also recently pointed to the critical flaws of most scholarly articles on 
the psychological effects of the power pose, which compare expansive and contractive poses, yet 
do not benchmark them with a neutral pose. Such treatment comparisons are akin to giving to a 
treated group a medicine (M) that is supposed to cure an illness and to give to the control group a 
poison (P) that is supposed to aggravate the health status of the patients. That longevity, y, is 
higher in M than P can arise because of a number of reasons, including that M has no effect at all 
and that P has a detrimental effect, or worse that both treatments reduce longevity with P having 
a greater effect. Hence, researchers should avoid comparisons that mix up two effects and prefer 
experimental designs that specify a clear control group representing a neutral level of the 
manipulated variable and of the related demand characteristics, and/or give different degrees 
(dosages) of the treatment. 
2.2. Non-consequential decision making: Hypothetical studies and missing incentives 
Behavioral sciences are “disciplines dealing with the subject of human actions” 
(emphasis added, The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016). However, behavioral scientists 
oftentimes conduct “hypothetical studies” that do not elicit actual behaviors (like vignettes, self-
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reports, questionnaires, hypothetical choice scenarios, see, e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 
2007; Furr, 2009). Hypothetical studies, similarly to standard questionnaires, suffer from the 
well-known problems of self-reported measures (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002; P. M. 
Podsakoff & Organ, 1986); it is uncertain whether the self-reported intentions will ultimately 
translate into real actions. Crucially, self-reported assessments can be misrepresented at no cost 
and are, therefore, particularly prone to demand effects, cheap talk, or socially desirable 
responses; such hypothetical situations usually do not have real-world tradeoffs or payoffs 
(Antonakis, 2017). On the contrary, studying actual, consequential behaviors and having 
tradeoffs and real consequences for the subject (instead of hypothetical self-reports of alleged 
behaviors) mitigates the impact of demand effects and social desirability bias. We do not, of 
course, argue that incentivized studies are completely shielded from demand effects. However, in 
incentivized studies taking an action that is expected to please the researcher or corresponds to 
the socially desirable choice is at least costly if this action is not the participant’s preferred one 
(e.g., in terms of payoff maximization). We therefore encourage researchers in all social sciences 
to design experiments in which participants’ choices have real consequences. 
How difficult it is to implement consequential choices in an experiment depends on many 
factors. In field experiments, for instance, the researcher typically does not need to explicitly 
incentivize any action, because choices are naturally consequential (e.g., the subject has a job to 
do). In the laboratory, in contrast, experimenters need to design decision-making environments to 
be consequential (Smith, 1976). In many studies, the easiest way to do so is by directly linking 
participants’ decisions to the monetary compensation that they receive for participating in the 
experiment. Such financial incentives motivate participants to be attentive and focused on the 
experiment (Antonakis, 2017; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001) and clarify the decision situation in 
which participants find themselves (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Smith 
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& Walker, 1993). In many settings that are of interest to OM researchers, it is clear how to set 
incentives. For example, Chen-Ritzo, Harrison, Kwasnica, and Thomas (2005) designed an 
experiment where subjects needed to formulate bids to provide a product. Bids were evaluated in 
three dimensions: Ask price, delivery lead time, and product quality. Whereas subjects did not 
know directly how their bids modified the buyer’s utility, they knew in advance how much it 
would cost to provide the auctioned good—given the combination of attributes offered—in the 
case they would win the auction. At the end of the game, subjects were paid in dollars based on 
how much profit they made (i.e., bid price minus cost whenever they were the winners of the 
auction) based on their decisions. In such cases, not making participants’ compensation 
contingent on their performance would seem rather unnatural. 
Is our conclusion that un-incentivized experiments should never be run? No, yet we 
advise researchers to be extremely mindful about their low internal validity and we urge the 
profession to take the proper countermeasures. On the other hand, it is still appropriate to use 
vignettes if they are completely purged from demand effects and are based on a clearly 
quantifiable outcome, linked to a real-world analog (e.g., choosing who among two individuals 
looks the more competent, where unbeknown to the subjects the individuals depicted competed 
for a political election, see Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005). Also, because it is 
difficult to make vignette studies consequential via monetary incentives, we hope to see more 
researchers employing non-traditional stimulus materials, which can enhance the psychological 
realism and the immersion in hypothetical experimental environments (video-based vignettes 
rather than written ones, virtual reality interactions, see, e.g., Aguinis & Bradley, 2014; 
Antonakis, 2017; Blascovich et al., 2002; DeHoratius, Gürerk, Honhon, & Hyndman, 2015; 
Harrison, Haruvy, & Rutström, 2011; N. P. Podsakoff, Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Klinger, 2013). 
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Moreover, the use of financial incentives is not the only way to render choices 
consequential in the laboratory. Depending on the research question and the task that participants 
face in the experiment, other types of extrinsic motivators (e.g., Boyce, Brown, McClelland, 
Peterson, & Schulze, 1992; Falk & Szech, 2013), intrinsic motivators (i.e., genuine interest in the 
task), social structures (e.g., a participant’s status in the group), psychological rewards (e.g., 
praise or recognition), and even biological factors (e.g., hormones) can induce consequences as 
well (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). Hence, experimentalists can, and should, create consequential environments by 
applying all possible sources of motivation, being however mindful about their potential 
interplays. For instance, when intrinsic motivation is large, additional extrinsic motivators will 
not necessarily be effective and might even backfire (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 
2009; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Grant, 2008). As a result, tasks that are perceived as relevant 
for self-esteem (e.g., score on an IQ test) might require a smaller or perhaps no formal 
incentivizing mechanism to be consequential. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the comments above are targeted at experiments 
that focus on behaviors as the dependent variable: We do not argue that all self-reported measures 
elicited in experiments are problematic. For instance, if the dependent variable of interest is an 
emotion or a perception, it makes little sense to make participants’ answers consequential. 
Moreover, if researchers elicit not only participants’ behaviors, but also their beliefs about the 
behavior of other participants, incentivizing beliefs does not only increase belief accuracy, but 
may—depending on the situation—also distort actual behavior (Blanco, Engelmann, Koch, & 
Normann, 2010; Gächter & Renner, 2010). Besides, not all types of behavior are equally prone to 
social desirability bias (e.g., risk preferences can be measured well without an explicit incentive, 
see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011). However, in most cases researchers are well advised to study 
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strongly consequential behavior in order to minimize the ambiguity about the correct 
interpretation of the observed data. 
2.3. Demand-inducing manipulation checks 
When researchers run experimental treatments that affect participants subjectively (e.g., 
framing or affective reaction), manipulation checks are often required to ensure that an 
intervention had the desired effect (Perdue & Summers, 1986; Shadish et al., 2002; Sigall & 
Mills, 1998). Manipulation checks usually consist of one or multiple direct questions, where 
subjects are asked to report to which extent they were affected by the treatment. Being based on 
self-reports, however, manipulation checks have the potential to create unwanted demand effects 
and should be conducted cautiously, despite their importance. 
As a general rule, researchers should not run manipulation checks when the experimental 
treatment consists of objective variations of parameters (e.g., costs or valuations), frames (e.g., 
gain vs. loss frame) or structures of a game (e.g., order of movers, group size), because such 
interventions do not need to be actively interpreted by the experimental subjects. If the 
manipulation is assumed to alter only a psychological state, however, manipulation checks should 
always be conducted after the main construct of interest (Antonakis, 2017; Kidd, 1976; Perdue & 
Summers, 1986; Sigall & Mills, 1998); though, ideally, they should be done on a separate sample 
for the sorts of experiments social scientists normally do. If assessed before the main outcome of 
interest, manipulation checks provide clear cues on the experimental treatment and indirectly 
signal how the experimenter hopes participants to behave (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). They draw 
the attention of the participants to subtle elements of the experimental situation (i.e., the 
treatment) that were not so salient prior to the manipulation check and might affect their decision-
making. 
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Performing manipulation checks after the main experiment partially solves this issue, yet 
such a procedure is not riskless either: If manipulation checks clearly reveal the purpose of the 
experiment, participants might report biased responses in the manipulation check, because they 
internalized the demand of the experimenter (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). Of course, participants 
may respond in a cognitively consistent matter on the manipulation check following how they 
responded to the treatment, which is reminiscent of the common-method/source problem (P. M. 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). Hence, the optimal solution to this problem is to use 
an “external manipulation check,” that is, test whether the manipulation was effective using a 
different—yet comparable—sample (Antonakis, d’Adda, Weber, & Zender, 2014; Bendahan et 
al., 2015). Moreover, unless the manipulation check is objective and not subject to psychological 
bias, it is also a good idea to elicit manipulation checks for multiple dimensions and/or to also 
include filler questions (i.e., questions that are not related to the manipulation check), in order not 
to provide precise clues about the experimental hypothesis. For sake of transparency, scholars 
should also report all the manipulation checks they conducted in an experiment, and thus disclose 
all possible sources of demands in their study (Abbey & Meloy, 2017). 
Moreover, manipulation checks should not be confused with attention/remembering 
checks (Abbey & Meloy, 2017). First, a subject correctly recalling the manipulation does not 
mean that the intervention successfully induced the particular physiological or psychological state 
of mind hypothesized. Second, if an intervention is inconsequential and lacks psychological 
realism (i.e., what we usually find in most hypothetical vignette studies), it will induce no 
specific mental state, nullifying the scope of the manipulation check. In this case, passing the 
manipulation check will—at best—indicate that the subjects internalized the experimental 
demand and responded accordingly. 
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2.4. Deception: Lack of control due to lack of credibility 
Deception is a different type of experimental confound that refers to the purposeful act of 
lying, misleading, or misrepresenting the purpose of the experimental study to the subjects 
(Antonakis, 2017). Typical examples of deception include lying about the consequence of 
decisions (e.g., untruly claiming that a particular choice has a monetary consequence for another 
participant), misrepresenting the identity of other participants (e.g., presenting confederates as 
normal participants, or claiming that a subject is playing a game with another subject when in 
reality decisions are taken by a computer), and providing false feedback or distorted information 
to participants (e.g., misreporting decisions of other participants, or giving false feedback on a 
subject’s performance). Whereas social psychologists and management scholars customarily 
make use of deception (see, e.g., Ariely & Norton, 2007; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001), the use of 
deception is strongly discouraged in economics (Davis & Holt, 1993; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; 
Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002)
1
. Note that failing to specify the treatment conditions or not 
explaining the purpose of the experiment is not considered deception, but “obfuscation” 
(Antonakis, 2017) and is a broadly accepted practice. In a laboratory experiment, for instance, if a 
researcher explains to subjects that they will be “matched with another person in the room”, s/he 
is not technically deceiving the participants if subjects can—in reality—be re-matched only 
within a portion of the people sitting in the room. 
We take a very clear position against deception. From our point of view, the main 
arguments against deception are twofold. Ethically, we find it bad role modeling when scientists 
institutionalize lying, even if temporarily. Moreover, although most participants do not 
                                                 
1 Paragraph 8.07 of the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct” of the American Psychological Association 
defines clear standards for the use of deception in psychological research. Among other things, the paragraph states that deception 
is only to be used if effective nondeceptive alternative procedures are not feasible. Unfortunately, however, the profession seems 
to have agreed to interpret this rule in a very lax manner, because given its prevalence, it seems that many psychologists use 
deception out of convenience rather than necessity. 
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experience much harm by being deceived, and even if psychologists routinely debrief their 
participants after the study, the use of deception poses a serious threat to one of the main pillars 
of experimental research: Control (Jamison, Karlan, & Schechter, 2008; Ortmann & Hertwig, 
2002). In order to establish a causal effect of an intervention and maintain full control over the 
experimental information environment, it is of outmost importance that the participants take the 
information that the researcher provides at face value. On the contrary, a participant who has 
been deceived before will become increasingly suspicious in subsequent experiments about the 
instructions provided or the stated purpose of the experiment. In addition, the loss of control may 
not only affect participants who have been directly deceived. Once the word is out that a 
particular laboratory uses deceptive methods, this information will spread and may contaminate 
the whole subject pool (Jamison et al., 2008; Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002). Thus, the simple 
knowledge that a laboratory, or, at worst, an entire research field, systematically lies to 
participants might be enough to call the validity of experimental research into question. 
However, despite the fact that we strongly advise against the use of deception, we 
recognize that there are different levels of severity of the problem. For instance, let us assume 
that some experimental subjects are invited to a bargaining experiment. They are told that they 
will negotiate with another participant and will be paid according to their performance in the task. 
In reality, however, they are paired with a computer playing a pre-recorded strategy and are paid 
with a flat fee. After the experiment, they are debriefed and learn that none of their decisions 
mattered at all. How much attention or effort will such participants give to the instructions that 
they receive in the next experiment? We could argue that this experience will affect the level of 
effort exertion significantly in the future. Conversely, other forms of deception are ethically 
innocuous, yet could be easily avoided. For example, in several system dynamics papers, subjects 
are told they will play a Beer Game for X periods, whereas they play the game for Y < X periods 
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(e.g., Sterman, 1989). There may be good reasons for why subjects should not know when 
exactly the experiments will end. However, instead of lying to subjects, researches could simply 
use the “continuation probability” method (see e.g., Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2011 for an example).2 
This method is better suited than deception for at least two reasons. First, subjects have the 
correct information when they make their decisions (a false belief that there are a finite number 
of periods may also have an impact on behavior in non-final periods). Second, the method 
completely avoids the negative spillover effects of deception on future experiment. Alternatively, 
the number of repetitions of a game could simply remain undisclosed; however, this approach 
creates uncertainty and—depending on the game—may render predictions and interpretations 
difficult. The lack of a quantifiable risk of termination in a particular round reduces experimental 
control, because it generates unpredictable subjective beliefs (i.e., participants might form 
different expectations about the ending round; moreover, the experimenter has no control over 
their belief formation process).  
The concerns outlined above are most relevant for laboratory research, whereas in many 
field settings, the reputational problem is less relevant, because most subjects may participate 
only once in an experiment and communication with potential participants of other field 
experiments may be unlikely. Moreover, field experimentation often involves additional 
logistical and budgetary limitations (e.g., management vetoes, logistical and strict ethical 
constraints, see Eden, 2017), which makes it more complex to avoid deception by design. 
Whereas we still advise avoiding deception whenever possible, we admit that there are 
exceptional cases in which the importance of the research may justify the use of a reasonable 
                                                 
2 There are different versions to implement continuation probabilities. If it is important to have the same number of periods in 
different sessions (for comparability reasons), the realization of the random process can be determined once for all sessions 
together. 
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amount of deception in the field (for an example of obfuscation in the field, see Fehr & Goette, 
2007; for an example of deception in the field, see Kröll & Rustagi, 2016). 
2.5. Threats to statistical validity 
So far, we have focused on design practices that ensure the internal validity of an 
experimental study before and while data is collected. However, equally important is statistical 
validity, that is, the right choice of method when data is analyzed (Shadish et al., 2002). A plot of 
the raw data and a simple comparison of treatment means should be present in all experimental 
papers and would normally provide substantive answers to the research question. However, after 
having shown the existence of a treatment effect, many scholars want to dig into the causal 
mechanism behind it, resorting to regression analysis. In those cases, specific statistical cautions 
are required. Examining in details statistical validity threats would require extensive discussion; 
thus, we briefly mention five of the main problems that often plague the analysis of experimental 
data. 
[Table 1 about here] 
2.5.1. Incorrect inference 
Correct inference requires a correct modeling of the residuals in the regression model. If 
observations are independent, the residuals can be assumed to be a random variable with mean 
zero, and to be identically and independently distributed across observations. In many 
experiments, however, the design of the experiment implies that independence across 
observations is not necessarily given for all data points. For instance, experimental data regularly 
entails so-called “clusters” within which observations cannot be treated as independent. In 
clustered data, residuals are independent across clusters, but not within clusters. Data clusters 
emerge if there is a common factor that affects all observations within the cluster (e.g., 
individuals taking decisions in a group setting, where they observe the decisions of group 
18 
 
 
members). Ignoring the cluster structure leads to biased standard errors and, potentially, false 
statistical significance (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004; 
Cameron & Miller, 2015; Wooldridge, 2015). 
A possible solution for the clustering problem is to aggregate the data at the relevant level 
of analysis (e.g., individual, team, or entire experimental session). With such “collapsed” data, 
serial correlation between observations in the same group does not pose a problem, because 
heterogeneity across entities is averaged out. This procedure simplifies the problem of comparing 
treatment and control groups as a (non-)parametric test for differences-in-means across two or 
more groups. Multi-level random effects models are also a solution, yet they do not automatically 
model both the heteroscedasticity and the autocorrelation present in the data (Primo, Jacobsmeier, 
& Milyo, 2007). Moreover, random effects models assume the random effect (the group specific 
disturbance, usually referred to as the 𝑢𝑗term) to be independent from the covariates; if this 
assumption fails, the estimator is not consistent and modeling what are called the “fixed-effects” 
in econometrics is required (see, e.g., Antonakis et al., 2010; Bollen & Brand, 2010; Bou & 
Satorra, 2018; Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017) 
Correct inference requires the use of cluster-robust estimation of the variance
3
 (see the 
seminal work of K.-Y. Liang & Zeger, 1986), which takes into account that residuals may be 
arbitrarily correlated within clusters (Bertrand et al., 2004). Typical examples of necessary—
though sometimes neglected—clustered standard errors include:  
1. Interaction among fixed group. In an auction experiment, two buyers and two sellers interact 
repeatedly in the same group, either in the same role or switching their roles. The correct cluster 
level is, hence, the group.  
                                                 
3 More specifically, the cluster-robust variance estimator is an asymptotically consistent solution for the inference problem (i.e., it 
converges to the population value of the variance as the sample size increases, Angrist & Pischke, 2008). 
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2. Repeated interactions. In a Newsvendor experiment, each participant plays several rounds 
deciding how many units to produce with the objective of maximizing their profit given a 
demand that is realized after they make their production decision. The individual orders will be 
autocorrelated over time (e.g., individual characteristics, experience, shocks) and the researcher 
should cluster the standard errors at the individual level to capture this feature of the data. An 
alternative to clustering standard errors is to analyze averages per individual across all periods as 
the unit of analysis.   
3. Repeated interactions in changing groups. In a Beer Game, participants interact repeatedly 
with each other in groups of four, but the groups are randomly recomposed at the beginning of 
every period. Because participants carry their past experiences from interacting with others from 
group to group, all choices within the matching group within which people are re-matched are in 
the same cluster. Thus, if the re-matching takes place within the session, standard errors need to 
be clustered at the session level (alternatively, the researcher must collapse data at the session 
level). 
In general, it is best practice to cluster standard errors at the highest level possible if it is 
unreasonable to safely assume the experimental observations are fully independent; however, the 
researcher should ensure that there are a sufficient number of clusters (i.e., usually between 30 
and 50 should do) else inference will be compromised (cf. Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2011). 
Interested readers can refer to more extensive treatments of this topic to ensure consistency of 
inference in more complex situations, including where clustering is multiway or disturbances are 
autoregressive (e.g., Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Bollen & Curran, 2004; Cameron, Gelbach, & 
Miller, 2011; Cameron & Miller, 2015). 
20 
 
 
2.5.2. Failed randomization: session effects and small sample sizes 
Causal identification of treatment effects requires randomization. If randomization fails, 
treatment and control groups are not comparable ex-ante and observed differences in the 
dependent variable cannot be causally attributed to the treatment. As long as the selection process 
is orthogonal to the treatment, controlling for observable characteristics that are known to 
influence y will partially correct the bias (i.e., these effects are removed from the disturbance and 
modelled explicitly). Of course, this solution is not perfect because participants who differ in 
observable characteristics may also differ in unobservable ones. However, if some observable or 
unobservable variables correlate with both the treatment status and the dependent variable of 
interest, the treatment effect will be confounded (Angrist & Pischke, 2008; Antonakis et al., 
2010; Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2014). 
One possible reason for randomization failure is the presence of so called session effects. 
Ideally, treatments are randomized within session. However, in some laboratory experiments, it is 
difficult or impossible to allocate different subjects to different treatments within the same 
session. As a result, sessions are separated by treatment. To minimize the threat that systematic 
differences across sessions confound the treatment effect, it is crucial that the random assignment 
of treatments to sessions is done in a balanced way that keeps as many factors as possible 
constant across treatments (subject pool, laboratory, time of the day; for details, see, e.g., 
Fréchette, 2011). 
Another threat to clean randomization comes from small sample sizes. Small samples may 
lead to an unbalanced representation of observed and unobserved characteristics subjects in the 
treatment and control group (Strube, 1991). Moreover, data analyses in smaller samples are very 
sensitive to outliers (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Joo, 2013), are heavily unstable with respect to the 
analytical strategy chosen (Button et al., 2013), and have low statistical power (Ioannidis, 2005); 
21 
 
 
at the research field level, small sample sizes tend to inflate the effect size of the treatment, given 
that only significant results are usually published (Antonakis, 2017; Button et al., 2013; 
Ioannidis, 2008). But how small is small? Determining an exact threshold that applies in all 
situations is clearly complex: The magnitude of the treatment effect investigated might vary 
dramatically across situations and only an a priori power calculation can provide accurate 
answers. However, recent methodological suggestions call for at least 20 (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011) or more recently 50 observations per cell (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 
2013). In a series of simple Monte Carlo simulations, we also identify as 50 the minimal sample 
size requirement per experimental cell in simple empirical settings. Clearly, larger samples are 
preferable, yet smaller samples might still be enough: Our results—despite being by no means 
complete and based on certain assumptions—suggest that a sample size of 25 per cell has roughly 
a 26% failed randomization rate with one unobservable binary covariate (see Appendix A.3), 
which might be acceptable in some situations. Even though studies with small sample sizes 
should be avoided whenever possible, if ethical or logistical issues prevent the collection of large 
samples, researchers should alleviate this problem by: (a) showing the ex-ante comparability of 
the treatment and the control groups via summary statistics of the main control variables (i.e., 
age, gender, university major, etc. should be equally represented in the two conditions) or (b) 
including control variables in regression model, and hence show that the treatment effect is not 
directly driven by their inclusion or exclusion (for a brief overview, see Eden, 2017, p. 96). 
To deal with small samples, researchers can also turn to fractional designs to reduce the 
treatment dimensionality without losing identification. This method consists of selecting only a 
subset of the treatments that would be run in a full factorial experiment, by constructing a set of 
conditions that allow the attribution of the statistical effect uniquely to a factor (Gunst & Mason, 
2009; Nair et al., 2008). Thus, fractional designs can be useful in operations research: When 
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testing some manufacturing conditions, for instance, the number of factors and their potential 
levels can easily become unmanageable (see, e.g., Adenso-Diaz & Laguna, 2006). With 
fractional experiments, however, researchers can only make cross cell comparisons and cannot 
estimate interaction effects. Also, average marginal effects (i.e., main effects) can only be 
estimated if the interaction term can be safely assumed to be zero. For most applications in the 
social sciences, the researchers should not only justify the choice of a fractional design based on a 
pure logistical need (e.g., lack of funding, participants’ sample is small); they should also use 
clear theoretical grounds to justify which conditions to run.  
2.5.3. Endogenous mediators and causal non-identification 
Experiments are a key way to solve the endogeneity problem typical of cross-sectional 
studies. However, endogeneity bias can also be hidden in experimental data, and mediation 
models are especially prone to this issue. OM, as well as management and applied and social 
psychology scholars, are often interested in the mechanism behind a certain treatment effect and 
engage in mediation analyses (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). Usually, those researchers include a 
measured mediator variable when analyzing the effect through which the experimental treatment 
apparently impacts a dependent variable. However, this procedure is potentially problematic: If 
the mediator is not randomly assigned and an omitted cause correlates both with the mediator and 
with the dependent variable, an endogeneity problem will emerge. The possibility of simultaneity 
may also be present, as will, in most cases, measurement error (thus rending the mediator 
endogenous). 
Endogeneity leads to inconsistent and biased estimates, posing serious problems both in 
large and small samples. In order to correct for this bias, the authors should examine whether the 
mediator is actually endogenous (via an Hausman test, Hausman, 1978) and use an instrumental 
variable estimator (Antonakis et al., 2010; Emsley, Dunn, & White, 2010) instead of the standard 
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OLS or ANOVA. Finally, researchers should also mind the problem of specious mediation 
(modeling the wrong mediator that correlates with the true mediator), as well as causally 
unidentified mediation chains (Fischer, Dietz, & Antonakis, 2016): A causally identified 
mediation model needs to have at least a unique exogenous predictor per endogenous mediator, 
the unique exogenous variable/s must be excluded from the y equation, and the system of 
equations must be estimated using an instrumental variable estimator (Antonakis et al., 2010; 
Antonakis, Bendahan, et al., 2014).  
The nature of this problem can be better understood with an example. Let us assume that a 
researcher wants to study the effects of stockout on customer satisfaction. The experimenter 
presents experimental subjects with several versions of a vignette where participants are told that 
a hypothetical company has either incurred a stockout due to a technical failure or that a company 
has incurred in a stockout because of the negligence of a supplier. The researcher assesses three 
perceptual measures: (a) how much the experimental subjects attribute responsibility to the 
company for the stockout, (b) the anger of potential customers toward the company and (c) their 
hypothetical intention to buy from the described firm again (cf. Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). 
Anger, predicted by treatment status, is theorized to mediate the relationship between 
responsibility attribution and future intention-to-buy. Estimating this model using a Structural 
Equation Model and not “instrumenting” the potentially endogenous mediator can be 
problematic, because several omitted causes might predict the endogenous variables (e.g., 
personal characteristics of an individual, demand effects, transient effects). An instrumental 
variable estimator is, thus, needed. However, the model has two endogenous variables (i.e., 
attribution of responsibility and anger), making it even more complex to achieve causal 
identification: The researchers would need to find at least two instruments to assess the causal 
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claims of their theory, meaning that they should have manipulated two variables that would 
strongly predict the mediators. 
2.5.4. Lagged dependent variables 
In several OM applications, researchers are interested in estimating models with lagged 
dependent variables used as covariate (e.g., demand at time 𝑡 depends on demand at time 𝑡 − 1). 
The logic is clear: The level of an outcome today might be dependent on yesterday’s level and the 
researcher might be interested in explicitly modeling the adjustment dynamics. However, the 
lagged variable might be endogenous itself (Bollen & Curran, 2006; Fischer et al., 2016; 
Wooldridge, 2010). Where is the issue? The lagged variable is correlated with the individual-
specific error term, which is correlated with the dependent variable and with all its lags. As soon 
as the individual-specific error term is correlated with even one of the other independent 
variables, the whole equation will suffer from endogeneity bias regarding that variable, whose 
effect cannot be interpreted; of course, the effects of exogenous variables in the equation, which 
will be orthogonal to the lagged variable, can be interpreted. If the interpretation of the lag is 
important, the solution to this problem is slightly involved (T. W. Anderson & Hsiao, 1982; 
Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998). Intuitively, however, it reduces to using further 
lags of the dependent variable as instruments for the first difference of the lagged variable, and 
the implemented solution is available in many standard statistical packages such as Stata and R. 
Models that fail to use this correction present endogeneity bias, regardless whether the panel 
effects are specified as random or fixed, and estimate parameters inconsistently.  
2.5.5. Issues of non-compliance 
As in medical experiments where some participants fail to take the treatment as 
prescribed, participants in social sciences experiments might not comply with instructions in an 
experiment (e.g., L. H. Liang et al., 2018, where participants had to do a task that they did not 
25 
 
 
find appropriate and some did not comply). Note, this issue is different from failing a 
manipulation check, wherein a participant may still have been treated (though the below remedy 
will also correct for possible biased estimates in this case too). Similarly, in the field, subjects 
may not follow all the rules set by an experimenter and—ultimately—fail to be treated4. All these 
issues are known as “non-compliance” problems and pose a challenge to randomized experiments 
when the non-compliance status is correlated with the treatment status (Glennerster & 
Takavarasha, 2013; Gupta, 2011). Internal validity is compromised if non-compliers are 
removed: The experimenter will not be able to correctly recover the Average Treatment Effect 
(ATE), because an unobservable variable (e.g., an individual characteristic of the subject) affects 
both the likelihood of complying to the treatment and the outcome of the experiment.  
Excluding subjects who were assigned to a treatment but did not receive it (i.e., the non-
compliers) is not a viable solution, because randomization ensures balance on observable and 
unobservable characteristics only ex-ante (Montgomery, Nyhan, & Torres, 2016; Reis & Judd, 
2000). However, statistical solutions allow the recovery of a causally interpretable estimate of the 
treatment effect, even though they alter the interpretation and the generalizability of the 
experimental results. A first possibility is to carry out the analysis on all subjects, both the ones 
who received the treatment and the ones who did not (the so-called “intention to treat analysis”, 
Gupta, 2011). This analysis requires no assumptions, yet does not estimate the treatment effect 
per se, but rather the effect of being randomly allocated to the treatment group (i.e., being eligible 
for treatment). Whether or not this method is appropriate depends on the research question. For 
example, if the researcher is interested in the overall effect of a field intervention (e.g., the impact 
                                                 
4 Such scenario is different from non-random attrition, that is, the systematic loss of some subjects during the experiment (which 
can be solved with selection correction or other methods, see, e.g., Duflo, Glennerster, & Kremer, 2007; Heckman, 1979) 
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of the introduction of a virtual collaboration tool on the productivity of the teams in an 
organization), the intention to treat analysis yields the desired result. 
A second solution involves using instrumental variables and exploits the fact that the 
random allocation into a treatment is the perfect instrument, being—by definition—independent 
from any experimental outcome or pre-existing individual characteristics. The experimenter can 
run a two stage model, whereby the allocation into a condition predicts whether the treatment was 
actually received (e.g., if the manipulation was successful for that specific individual), which, in 
turn, further explains the outcome of interest (Duflo et al., 2007; Gerber & Green, 2008). The 
obtained estimate does not represent the ATE anymore, but the LATE (Local Average Treatment 
Effect), which measures the treatment effect in the compliers subpopulation (Angrist, Imbens, & 
Rubin, 1996). Returning to the above example, this method would therefore reveal the impact of 
the virtual collaboration tool on the employees who actually use it. Thus, it is crucial that 
researchers carefully evaluate which method fits their research question to avoid 
misinterpretation of observed effects. 
3. EXTERNAL VALIDITY: GENERALIZABILITY TO ENVIRONMENTS OUTSIDE 
THE LABORATORY? 
So far, our discussion has focused on methodological elements that ensure the internal 
validity of experimental studies. Yet, rigor alone—although the first step toward understanding 
the nature of a phenomenon and a necessary condition for knowledge application—is not enough 
(cf. Vermeulen, 2005). Rigorous studies only have scientific value in applied domains if they are 
also relevant; for basic research, the relevance criterion is not immediately obvious nor should it 
necessarily be (Antonakis, 2017). 
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What relevance means heavily depends on the question in which the researcher is 
interested. In many studies, the purpose of an experiment is to test a particular behavioral pattern 
predicted by a theory or to disentangle different psychological mechanisms behind an observed 
effect (see Roth, 1987). For studies of this type, relevance is determined by the degree to which 
the decision environment allows for clean and powerful tests of the theory or mechanism in 
question. The laboratory offers great advantages for this purpose, because the researcher has full 
control over the decision environment in which participants operate (Rubinstein, 2001). In the 
laboratory, institutions and complex systems can be exogenously manipulated at relatively low 
costs and the researcher can easily create counterfactual states of interest that might not be 
possible to set up in reality. These features allow researchers to pin down relevant causal effects, 
which are notoriously hard to identify outside of the laboratory.  
However, OM research and, even more generally, the management discipline as a whole 
is also practice-oriented and aims at making policy suggestions to a professional audience 
(Holmström, Ketokivi, & Hameri, 2009; Meredith, 2001; Vermeulen, 2005). If experiments aim 
at informing policy or management, their relevance is largely determined by the generalizability 
of results to real-life environments outside of the laboratory. The issue of generalizability is, 
however, not specific to data generated in the laboratory. Many field studies identify a 
phenomenon in a particular setting and whether or not the findings can be extrapolated to other 
environments remains to be determined (see Falk & Heckman, 2009 for a detailed discussion). 
Nevertheless, many researchers are especially skeptical when it comes to the 
generalization of laboratory results. The most common concerns are that laboratory settings are 
artificial and unrealistic (see, e.g., Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982; Colquitt, 2008) and that 
student participants are not representative of the populations of interest (Levitt & List, 2007a, 
2007b). We understand the prima facie appeal of these arguments, but we believe that much of 
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the skepticism regarding the generalizability of laboratory evidence is based on 
misunderstandings about existing evidence on the topic (Camerer, 2015; Falk & Heckman, 2009; 
Kessler & Vesterlund, 2015). Still, we agree that there are limits to what the laboratory studies 
can accomplish. For instance, what we find particularly troublesome is the use of vignette-type 
experimental studies (especially using students), where organizational-level operations 
management phenomena are studied, and wherein claims are made to provide policy 
implications. In the following, we discuss our view in more detail and summarize existing 
evidence on this issue. 
3.1. Generalization: Can we extrapolate findings from the lab to environments outside 
of the lab? 
In order to discuss whether laboratory findings are generalizable, we first must define 
what exactly we mean by external validity. Some authors argue that external validity requires that 
the quantitative effect identified in one set-up generalizes to other ones (Levitt & List, 2007a, 
2007b). It is clear that most laboratory experiments do not satisfy this strict standard (Ketokivi & 
McIntosh, 2017). Effect sizes typically depend on parameter choices and it is often difficult to tell 
what constitutes a “realistic” set of parameters. However, in line with Kessler and Vesterlund 
(2015), we argue that the quantitative definition of external validity makes little sense in the 
context of laboratory studies. The reason is that most experimental studies aim at identifying the 
direction of an effect rather than its precise quantitative size. Thus, the criterion for evaluating the 
external validity of these findings needs to be whether the sign of the effect remains constant 
across different environments. In this qualitative sense, external validity is ensured if the 
environmental differences between the laboratory and the field do not change the sign of the 
average marginal effect of a treatment. Even though the empirical assessments of external 
29 
 
 
validity in OM are still relatively rare, examples of laboratory experiments that have passed the 
test of qualitative external validity exist also in OM-related topics (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2014; 
Bolton, Ockenfels, & Thonemann, 2012; Olivares, Terwiesch, & Cassorla, 2008). 
However, how useful are laboratory experiments for policy makers and managers if these 
studies “only” get the sign of an effect right, but cannot determine the magnitude of the effect? 
Schram (2005, p. 232) answers this question as follows: “[a]fter a theoretical design, a test [of a 
new airplane] in a wind tunnel is the stage of laboratory experimentation. If it does not ‘crash’ in 
this experiment, the plane is not immediately used for the transport of passengers, however. One 
will typically conduct further tests in the wind tunnel under extreme circumstances. In addition, 
further testing including ‘real’ flights without passengers will be conducted.” In the same way, 
laboratory experiments typically constitute the first step in a series of studies. Given that many 
laboratory experiments are often tests of the behavioral assumptions or implications of a theory 
rather than tools for assessing the size of a statistical effect (Highhouse, 2009; Rubinstein, 2001), 
they are useful for capturing directional effects of theoretically informed treatments, yet await 
field tests for a more precise assessment of the practical effect.  
One important advantage of laboratory experiments is that they are very easy to replicate 
(Camerer, 2015). Significant results will typically be investigated repeatedly and researchers will 
expose the effects to various tests to examine their robustness. Once an effect has survived these 
robustness checks in the laboratory and boundary conditions have been identified, researchers can 
move to the field to explore the effect size in the environment of interest. Thus, instead of seeing 
laboratory and field experiments at loggerheads and arguing about their relative superiority in 
particular contexts, researchers should start seeing these approaches as complements that 
reinforce each other (Camerer, 2015; Falk & Heckman, 2009; Kessler & Vesterlund, 2015). 
Overall, we see the balance between laboratory and field experiments as a matter of 
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“methodological fit” (Edmondson & McManus, 2007) that should be answered in light of the 
maturity of a research program.  
Finally, it is also important to discuss what researchers should do if qualitative external 
validity fails. It is important to understand that failure to replicate a treatment effect in the field 
does not imply that the laboratory result is necessarily “wrong” (Kessler and Versterlund 2015). 
The replication may have failed because the laboratory environment misses an important element 
that is present in the field. A good laboratory experiment is similar to a good theory (Bacharach, 
1989; De Treville, Edelson, Kharkar, & Avanzi, 2008; Wacker, 1998; Whetten, 1989): It strives 
to parsimony, simplifies the question of interest to its essence and abstracts from all irrelevant 
side-aspects that may hinder the clean identification of a causal effect (Plott, 1991). Sometimes, 
however, simplification goes too far and the design of an experiment leaves out a crucial element 
that characterizes the relevant field environment. Still, finding the crucial elements and real-
world analogs in the laboratory requires more and not fewer laboratory experiments, because 
laboratory experiments are a simple and effective tool to identify the boundary conditions under 
which an effect is present or not (Falk and Heckman 2009). 
3.2. Subject Pool Effects: Using Students, Representative Samples or Professionals as 
Participants 
Many laboratory experiments use students as participants. This practice is frequently 
criticized, because students are neither representative of the general population nor do they 
correspond to the populations that are of interest in most studies (Levitt & List, 2007a, 2007b). 
So, why do experimental researchers use students so frequently? Students are very convenient 
participants. Most laboratories are located at universities where students are readily available. 
Moreover, students tend to have low incomes and are thus likely to be motivated by the monetary 
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incentives offered in experiments. They also tend to be rather intelligent and understand abstract 
and complex instructions; moreover, they are used to interacting in computer-mediated 
environments. 
In terms of qualitative external validity, using students is only problematic if there are 
reasons to believe that the sign of an identified effect would be different in another subject pool. 
However, existing evidence suggests that this possibility is rather unlikely. Students are often 
similar to the general population and to professionals (see, e.g., C. A. Anderson, Lindsay, & 
Bushman, 1999; Fréchette, 2014; Herbst & Mas, 2015; Hosoda, Sone‐Romero, & Coats, 2003; 
Mitchell, 2012). Clearly, it is true that students are a highly selected sample, which may imply 
that their behavior does not correspond perfectly to the behavior of other, potentially more 
relevant, groups. For instance, several studies have found that students differ from the general 
population in the importance given to social preferences: They seem to be consistently less pro-
social than the general population, with economics students being less pro-social than other 
comparable students (see, e.g., Belot, Duch, & Miller, 2015; Exadaktylos, Espín, & Branas-
Garza, 2013; Falk, Meier, & Zehnder, 2013). However, as discussed above, there are many 
reasons for why findings of laboratory experiments can rarely be interpreted quantitatively in any 
case, so that these differences in magnitudes of effects should not be seen as a major issue. 
Moreover, existing evidence in OM and operations research seems to point at a qualitative 
similarity between the basic decision-making strategy of students and experienced managers. An 
early experimental study contrasted the performance of students and professionals in bargaining 
games (Siegel & Harnett, 1964); these researchers found that both sets of participants maximized 
joint profits and engaged in 50-50 splits. More recently, Bolton et al. (2012) studied a 
newsvendor task, finding evidence that managers behave similarly to students. More specifically, 
managers also display pull-to-center bias, that is, they put orders that are biased toward the center 
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point of the demand distribution. According to the Bolton et al. (2012) data, students are better at 
extracting analytic information from existing demand data, whereas managers are better at the 
beginning of the experiment, because they seem to use effectively information coming from their 
experience when the historical demand data are lacking. Interestingly, students end up over-
performing managers. 
Clearly, if researchers are interested in the quantitative magnitude of a treatment effect, 
using the population of interest as subjects in a laboratory experiment may be appealing (Stevens, 
2011). However, researchers should keep in mind that the effect size is not only determined by 
the subject pool. A quantitatively interpretable result also requires that the decision environment 
(i.e., the stake size, time frame, group size, etc.) is identical or at least highly similar to the 
relevant field setting. Moreover, close resemblance to the real world increases the familiarity of 
the participants with the experimental scenario (D. J. Cooper, Kagel, Lo, & Gu, 1999; 
Montmarquette, Rullière, Villeval, & Zeiliger, 2004). However, tight affinity to reality can come 
at a cost, confounding the experimental result (Smith, 1976): For instance, whereas framing 
effects might enhance mundane realism (e.g., cover stories), several researchers have shown that 
they might bias the behavioral outcomes measured in an experimental study (Andreoni, 1995; 
Kühberger, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
To conclude, the aim of research in the social sciences is to identify general behavioral 
patterns that are valid beyond the setting in which they are identified (Kessler & Vesterlund, 
2015). Laboratory experiments are characterized by a high level of control so that they can 
identify behavioral principles in a clean and systematic manner. Experimentalists are aware of the 
fact that the magnitude of the effects detected in a particular study heavily depends on the details 
of the setting; however, there is large agreement that the sign of the effect generalizes to other 
environments. It is also important to remember that generalizability alone is not a signal of high 
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quality. If the same endogeneity prone correlation generalizes to various environments, this 
spurious relationship tells us nothing about the causal impact of one variable on another. Thus, as 
stated earlier, it makes no sense to see a trade-off between rigor and relevance, because relevance 
ultimately requires rigor. 
4. REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL PRACTICES 
In this section, we examine whether experimental research complies with methodological 
best practices. We analyze the last 10 years of experimental research in OM. We limit the scope 
to 2006-2016, because other authors have already analyzed OM experimental research until 2006 
(Bendoly et al., 2006); thus, our review casts light on current research practice. We focus on four 
journals, widely considered as the top-tier outlets in OM: (a) Management Science
5
; (b) 
Production and Operations Management; (c) Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; 
(d) Journal of Operations Management. These journals are the only journals in OM that are part 
of the Financial Times 50 list and the UT Dallas Research list that also publish experimental 
work. On top of reviewing the current experimental research in OM, we also examined its 
relative standing compared to a random samples of experimental research published in top outlets 
in management (i.e., Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal 
of Management, Strategic Management Journal, Personnel Psychology), economics (i.e., 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, American Economic Review, Econometrica, Review of 
Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economy) and psychology (i.e., Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Organizational Behavior 
and Human Processes, Psychological Science; note, although the latter is a general psychology 
journal it is a common outlet for social-psychology articles). 
                                                 
5 We only focus on the Operations Management division of Management Science. Management Science also publishes 
experimental research covering other fields and their inclusion would have prevented a clear comparison between Management 
Science and other OM journals. 
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4.1. Method 
To include all possible published papers in the chosen OM journals, we first reviewed the 
existing publications using a search on Web of Science (i.e., search term in the “topic” field: 
“experiment” or “experiments”) and manually browsed through the abstract of all the issues 
published in the period 2006-2016. We excluded articles using natural experiments, re-analyses 
of already published experimental data, and articles in advance of print. Concerning the 
experimental research in the other fields, we selected a random sample of articles of non-OM 
disciplines: A random selection of articles should allow to have an unbiased representation of a 
discipline’s average experimental study and maintain a feasible workload level for the coders (cf. 
Antonakis et al., 2010; Bergh & Perry, 2006; Fischer et al., 2016; Kacmar & Whitfield, 2000). 
Using a search term in the “topic” field on Web of Science, we downloaded the list of all articles 
explicitly mentioning the words “experiment” or “experiments” either in the title, in the abstract 
or in the keywords, randomly ordered them and manually selected the first 50 articles that were 
relevant for our analysis. 
We then coded information from the articles sampled. Research assistants collected 
bibliographical information, whereas the first and the second author of this paper manually coded 
for the main markers of internal, statistical and external/ecological validity presented in the first 
part of the article. We took several steps to ensure that the coding procedures were as objective as 
possible. We first developed an initial version of the coding manual and adjusted it after two 
training phases on articles not included in the final sample. Afterwards, the two coders separately 
coded 20 articles from the reviewed sample. The two coders discussed their disagreements and 
calibrated their coding policies after consultation with the two other authors; the coders were then 
randomly assigned to independently code half of the sampled articles each (for details on the 
entire procedure, see Appendix A.1). 
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The two coders finally coded ten articles already coded by the other coder: We used data 
from these 20 articles to check coding agreement using the κ statistic (Viera & Garrett, 2005). 
Given that not all the coded dimensions were finally included in the data analysis, we limited our 
attention only to the categories reported in the remainder of the paper. On this subsample, the 
agreement between coders was 78.1%, which was clearly better than the 9.7% expected 
agreement due to chance, leading to a 𝜅 = .76 (z = 53.82, p < .01, see Appendix A.2 for details 
on this procedure). Such a level of agreement can be classified as “substantial” (Landis & Koch, 
1977). Finally, following the computation of the inter-rater agreement statistics, the coders re-
checked their coding choices and made some corrections in three categories, because of 
systematic differences in the coding decisions (see Appendix A.2 for details
6
). As a result, the 
reported κ statistics should be regarded as a conservative (i.e., lower-bound) proxy of the actual 
inter-coder agreement. Thus, although the agreement is very high, it is not perfect, which of 
course is reflected in some degree of judgment to extract the coding categories. 
For sake of transparency, all data and code necessary to replicate the 𝜅 computation, as 
well as the results reported in the rest of the article are publicly available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/5wc48wpmpk.1. 
4.2. Analysis and results 
We located 258 articles (111 from OM, 47 from economics, 50 from social psychology 
and 50 from general management), for a total of 468 experimental studies
7
 (i.e., several papers 
                                                 
6It came to our attention during the revision of this article that we did not code for non-compliance issues in the reviewed articles. 
Given time constraints, we took a random sample of 20 articles from OM journals and of 20 articles from non-OM disciplines to 
check the baseline rate. We found only two studies presenting a non-compliance issue. In both cases, however, the problem was 
correctly dealt with: The first article used an instrumental variable strategy, whereas the second article used a simple Intention-to-
treat analysis, yet justified this choice from a theory viewpoint (results available upon request). Thus, due to its low occurrence 
rate, we excluded this category from the remaining of the analysis. 
7 The dataset of articles initially allocated to coders contained 267 articles. During the coding procedures, we excluded 9 articles 
from the analysis, because we verified that they did not meet all inclusion criteria (i.e., they were initially included either because 
of a manual mistake or because their abstract incorrectly suggested they were an experimental study; see Appendix A.1 for details 
on the procedure). 
36 
 
 
reported more than a single study). The definition of all coding categories can be found in 
Appendix A.2; complete descriptive statistics can be found in Table A.3 of the Appendix. Before 
moving to the data analysis, it is worth mentioning that our data clearly underline how the 
reviewed experimental research in OM appears not to be a uniform field. Whereas a subset of 
OM experimental research has a clear experimental economics/decision science undergirding 
(55%), a second subset of studies is closer to the applied psychology, management or 
organizational behavior area (44%); the pure engineering/operations research disciplines have a 
minimal representation (1%). Thus, when illustrative, throughout our analysis we differentiate 
between an “economics-based OM” and “non-economics-based OM” clusters, so to have a more 
fine-grained understanding of relevant patterns within the field. 
4.2.1. Internal validity differences 
We first map the variance in internal and statistical validity across different fields, with 
the objective of summarizing relevant descriptive trends at the academic field level. In Table 2, 
we regress the likelihood of adopting the internal and statistical validity suggestions on five 
academic field dummy variables (with economics being the baseline/omitted category), as well as 
a series of bibliographical controls (e.g., average number of studies, impact factor of publications, 
etc.), journal, publication-year and coder fixed effects. We use dichotomous dependent variables, 
indicating whether an experimental study followed or did not follow each of our methodological 
suggestions. We employ a linear probability model, rather than a limited dependent variable 
model for ease of interpretation with respect to the marginal effects (see Angrist & Pischke, 2008 
for a technical argument in favor of this choice)
8
. For increasing the interpretability of our results, 
we mean-center all covariates (but not the dummy coefficients of interest): As a result, the 
                                                 
8 Given that some academic fields always have the same value for specific dependent variables (i.e., we coded as 0 or as 1 all 
experimental studies coming from the same discipline), logit or probit models would have been unable to estimate the relevant 
dummy variable coefficient (Caudill, 1988). 
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constant term can be interpreted as the predicted probability for economics to engage in either of 
our methodological suggestions (at the means of all covariates), whereas the beta coefficients of 
the academic field dummies can be interpreted as marginal effects compared to economics. 
The results show that both OM subfields seem to better address the quest for rigor than 
management and social psychology do; yet the OM subfields usually lag behind economics in 
this dimension. Both OM subfields are significantly more likely than economics to be non-
incentivized and to report no form of compensation to the subjects (column (1), 𝛽 = .17, p < .01 
for economics-based OM; 𝛽 = .42, p < .01 for non-economics OM); however, economics-based 
OM papers are much more likely than non-economics ones to be incentivized. Only studies from 
the non-economics OM subfield have a significant probability of reporting demand-driven 
treatment comparisons (column (3), 𝛽 = .26, p < .05) and to be non-consequential (column (5), 𝛽 
= .25, p < .05), whereas none of the OM subfields seems to use deception or manipulation checks 
before the dependent variable or to deceive participants often (see columns (2) and (4)).  
In almost all dimensions, management and social psychology seem to be less likely to 
adopt our best-practice suggestions than does OM; however, management experiments normally 
show a lower probability of engaging in internal validity issues as compared to social psychology 
(aside from the probability of engaging in manipulation checks before the dependent variable, see 
column (2)). Clearly, some of the differences we observe might be explained by different 
research foci proper to each discipline. For instance—as we have argued before—designing 
consequential decision environments or including incentives in an experiment might not be 
needed in fields that study emotions or perceptual dependent variables (e.g., social psychology). 
However, incentives of this sort are easier to implement in disciplines that are more focused on 
financial metrics or other objective dependent variables (e.g., economics or OM). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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Even though economics-based OM scores better than non-economics OM studies in 
internal validity, the former’s situation is somewhat reversed for the statistical validity 
dimensions; moreover, OM as a whole seems to lag behind our suggestions in this area. Both 
subfields are more likely than economics to estimate incorrectly specified models (column (6), 𝛽 
= .12, p = .11 for economics-based OM; 𝛽 = .16, p < .05). Moreover, studies sampled from the 
economics-based OM field are more likely to fail to report correctly clustered standard errors 
than non-economics-based OM (column (7), 𝛽 = .17, p < .05 and 𝛽 = -.05, p = .51). Finally, both 
OM subfields are more likely than economics to have a small sample (column (8), 𝛽 = .36, p < 
.01 for economics-based OM and 𝛽 = .20, p < .10). We also report F tests for the differences in 
coefficients between the two OM subfields directly in Table (2). 
Concerning the other disciplines, economics appears to be the most rigorous field when it 
comes to statistical validity. Surprisingly, studies sampled from social psychology are less likely 
than the ones from economics to estimate incorrect standard errors (𝛽 = -.10, p < .10). There is, 
however, a caveat to the interpretation of these results. Almost 20% of studies in social 
psychology employ simple “differences-in-means” as the sole statistical test in their analysis 
(e.g., t-test, non-parametric test for equality of means or medians). Whereas these techniques are 
correct per se, if they do not violate the assumptions of the estimator and are done at the correct 
level of analysis, not reporting a regression or structural equation modeling analysis limits what 
can be tested in terms of multivariate effects. As a result, the statistical practice in this field 
shields these studies from problems emerging from incorrect estimation and clustering of 
standard errors. 
4.2.2. Potential generalizability to organizational environments 
In the second part of the analysis, we focus on proxies of generalizability to real 
organizations and to the working population, which usually represent the focus of the analysis in 
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OM and other organizational sciences. In Table 3, we regress three main proxies of potential 
generalizability on the academic field dummies and control for the same set of bibliographic 
control variables and fixed effects used in Table 2. The three proxies we chose are (a) use of 
EMBA students or (b) working adults as experimental subjects (i.e., sample generalization to real 
organizations) and (c) proportion of field experiments in each discipline (i.e., operational 
generalization). EMBA and working adults are “closer” than undergraduate students to the ideal 
participant in many studies of OM and management, namely, a working professional in a real 
organization; however, this point is not necessarily true for social psychology and economics, 
because these fields generalize beyond organizational phenomena. Moreover, field experiments 
represent the apex of realism in experimental research for all disciplines, to the extent that they 
measure behavior in its naturalistic environment. Hence, these proxies are measures of 
generalizability to—and not across—real professionals and organizations. That is, they do not 
quantify the actual external validity of an experimental finding, which would require replication 
studies and meta-analyses; yet, they indicate their potential generalizability to environments and 
populations that represent the ultimate interest for organizational sciences. 
Overall, we do not find clear evidence for a trade-off between internal validity and 
potential generalizability. The fields that were previously found to lag behind regarding standards 
of internal validity (i.e., non-economics OM, management and social psychology) are not 
systematically more generalizable. However, our data show that economics-based OM could 
improve significantly in the generalizability domains. In particular, our results underline that 
economics-based OM makes less widespread use of working adults as experimental subjects than 
does non-economics-based OM (column (1), 𝛽 = .00, p = .98 and 𝛽 = .18, p < .05). Furthermore, 
economics OM is less likely to employ graduate or EMBA students (column (2), 𝛽 = .04, p = .18 
and 𝛽 = .15, p < .01). However, as introduced above, both OM subfields employ significantly 
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less field experimentation compared to economics (column (3), 𝛽 = -.39, p < .01 and 𝛽= -.35, p < 
.01). We report formal F tests for the differences in coefficients between the two OM subfields 
directly in Table (3). 
Interestingly, we did not identify any article in social psychology reporting a field 
experiment; the management discipline hardly relies on field experimentation either (𝛽 = -.35, p 
< .01); the academic discipline that most frequently employs field experimentation is economics. 
Contrary to economics and economics-based OM, management and social psychology make 
significant use of EMBA students (𝛽 = .10, p < .05 and 𝛽 = .05, p < .05 respectively); however, 
they do not appear to make use of working adults as experimental samples (both 𝛽 coefficients 
are non-significant). To conclude, it is important to note that these results should be interpreted 
with caution: Many studies in social psychology and economics are interested in research 
questions that do not directly relate to organizational environments; thus, it is easy to see why 
they might not need to use EMBA or working adult samples. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2.3. Citation analysis: Let the market decide 
The heterogeneity of experimental practices we observe might be partly driven by the fact 
that the reviewed papers belong to different disciplines with distinct research interests and 
specializations. Part of the differences in observed experimental practices might therefore be 
justifiable by the specificities of the different fields. To examine this conjecture, we conducted a 
citation analysis (see, e.g., Antonakis, Bastardoz, Liu, & Schriesheim, 2014), because citations 
are a measure of academic relevance.  
We thus regressed the number of citations received by each paper in our sample (retrieved 
manually from Scopus in September 2017) on all the markers of rigor and generalizability. 
Specifically, we used five indicator variables capturing the following aspects of internal validity: 
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(i) no incentive/compensation for the experimental subject, (ii) non-consequential study, (iii) 
deception, (iv) demand-driven comparisons of treatments, and (v) manipulation check assessed 
before the measurement of the main dependent variable. We also used three indicator variables 
that coded for the generalizability potential of the study: (i) sample composed of working adults, 
(ii) sample composed of EMBA students, and (iii) field experiment. As proxies of statistical 
validity, we employed three measures already reported (i.e., incorrect estimation, incorrect 
inference, small-sample) and added a fourth indicator variable measuring whether the study 
employed simple “differences-in-means” as statistical test rather than more complex regression-
based analyses. This variable is included in our analysis for interpretation issues: The 16% of 
studies reporting only “differences-in-means” in our sample never engage in incorrect estimation 
or in incorrect inference simply because they do not report a regression-based model. 
Additionally, we also included a large set of bibliographical controls (e.g., article age, article age 
square, citations received by the author’s team, etc., see Table 4 for the complete list), coders 
fixed effects and journal fixed effects or—in alternative specifications—academic field fixed 
effects, in order to reduce the likelihood of omitted variable bias. Given that the number of 
citations received are counts, we used negative binomial regressions (Gardner, Mulvey, & Shaw, 
1995), which correctly models the “overdispersion” of the data present in our dataset (see Figure 
1 for a graphical overview of this pattern). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Our results can only be interpreted from a prediction standpoint and not causally (i.e., the 
design characteristics of a study are clearly not randomly assigned)
9
. The main results (see 
                                                 
9Antonakis et al. (2014) use an instrumental variable estimator to address the endogeneity problem of one of their independent 
variables. More specifically, they instrument the presence of endogeneity in a study with several bibliometric variables (e.g., 
author previous citations). In our setting, however, this possibility is prevented: Each internal, statistical and external/ecological 
validity proxy would need to be instrumented with a presumably exogenous variable and our dataset does not contain such a large 
number of potential instruments.  
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column (1), Table 4) underline that the baseline set of bibliographical controls and fixed effects 
have a strong joint explanatory power (Wald test: 𝜒2(27) = 837.59, p < .01). Most covariates 
seem to follow a similar pattern compared to the results reported by Antonakis, Bastardoz, et al. 
(2014), who engage in a similar citation analysis. However, some indicators for internal validity 
and of potential generalizability have significant explanatory power vis-à-vis academic relevance. 
Experiments that do not make use of any type of incentive in the laboratory (e.g., credit- or 
financial-based, both related or unrelated to actual performance obtained in the experimental 
task) are cited less (𝛽 = -.42, p < .01), as too are experiments that trigger demand effects (𝛽 = -
.23, p < .10). If combined, the inclusion of all internal validity issues leads to an increase in the 
explanatory power of the model (Wald test: 𝜒2(5) = 11.05, p = .05). The use of field 
experimentation has a positive and significant effect on total citations received (𝛽 = .34, p < .10). 
Overall, however, the generalizability proxies do not further increase the fit of the model 
significantly (Wald test: 𝜒2(3) = 5.40, p = .15). Similarly, the inclusion of statistical validity 
proxies leads to no improvement to the fit of the model (Wald test: 𝜒2(4) = 3.19, p = .53).  
To obtain an intuitive representation of some of these effects, we provide a graphical 
representation of our estimates in Figure 2, where we depict the average marginal effect of the 
main markers of internal, statistical and external/ecological validity on the citations received by 
an article (based on the regression specification of column (1), Table 4). It is immediate to see 
that the effect of most predictors, despite being not always individually significant, suggests that 
rigor and generalizability increase the impact of an article. Also, in Table 4 we report the linear 
combination of the effect of not employing our validity markers’ in experimental studies. This 
estimate (-.10, p < .05 for the model in column (1)) pools together the effect of all our 
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suggestions and underlines their overall relevance: Following the suggestions we propose should 
provide a citation advantage to journals. 
Finally, the second regression specification (see column (2), Table 4) reinforces almost all 
other reported findings, which are also robust across additional specifications and estimation 
methods (see Appendix A.4). To ensure that these effects are not driven by some individual 
academic fields or journals, in columns (3)-(6) of Table 4 we also report the results of a series of 
regressions estimated within each field. This analysis suggests that differences across fields are 
evident, yet most internal and external validity markers previously identified as important 
determinants of citations remain relevant predictors, even though they might drop below 
traditional significance levels (because of the lower statistical power caused by the limited 
sample size).  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
However, some within-field results are noteworthy. First, and contrary to the trend in 
other fields, the analysis suggests that OM rewards incorrectly estimated models in the “market 
for citations” (𝛽 = .51, p < .10, column (3)). This finding is somewhat worrisome, given that we 
have also documented how OM is among the fields lagging behind our statistical validity 
suggestions: Perhaps because the field has started to consider some of these statistical issues only 
recently (see Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2017), the profession still needs to discount the effect of 
incorrectly estimating models on academic impact. Second, non-consequential studies are 
rewarded in social psychology (𝛽 = .39, p < .10, column (6)), but not in other fields. As 
mentioned in the previous subsections, this result could be driven by the object of study of social 
psychology, which tends to focus more on perceptions rather than objective actions, making it 
more complex to design consequential experiments. Note also that social psychology experiments 
most frequently report self-reported/non-behavioral outcomes (almost 63%). Third—and 
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surprisingly—economics seems to reward small sample studies (𝛽 = .87, p < .01, column (4)), 
contrary to OM, which weakly devalues them (𝛽 = -.33, p < .10, column (3)). However, it should 
be noted that economics is the field that reports by far the lowest frequency of small samples 
(23% against more than 40% for all other fields). Although it is not clear as to what drives this 
effect, it may be that the few small sample studies in economics treat especially relevant topics or 
present other design features that make them exceptionally noteworthy. Lastly, only management 
seems to put a premium on experimental studies using working adults (𝛽 = .25, p < .10, column 
(5)), whereas OM does not significantly reward any external/ecological validity proxy. This 
result is somewhat puzzling in light of the attention towards practical relevance of OM: 
Intuitively, we would have expected the profession to strongly reward practices like field 
experimentation. However, field experiments represent a small percentage of OM reviewed 
studies (only 8%): Once more, unobservable characteristics of these few field experiments might 
make them less appealing for the citation market. 
[Insert Table 4 about here]  
Finally, we investigate whether experiments are more or less cited than other types of 
articles within each academic field: In other words, does publishing experimental research “pay 
off” for researchers? To answer this question, we first computed the number of citations per year 
received by an average article predicted by our main model (on the basis of the same 
specification as in Table 4, column (1), and using citations received per year rather than total 
citations as dependent variable). We then computed both the predicted total citations received by 
the average 2-year-old and by the average 5-year-old article we reviewed and contrasted them 
with two measures: (a) the median 2-year impact factor of each field and (b) the 5-year impact 
factor of the journals we included in our review (both retrieved from Scopus in September 2017).  
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Our results are displayed in Table 5 and suggest that the average experimental study we 
reviewed receives more citations than the median article in its field. If we restrict our attention 
only to the journals we reviewed in our article (i.e., which represent top publications in each 
domain), experimental articles are cited more than the average article published in top tier outlets 
in OM (+44%, p = .10); this effect is not significant, similarly to what we observe for economics 
(+11%) and social psychology (+28%). Only experiments in management are cited significantly 
less than average articles in top tier outlets (-55%, p < .01). This effect is strong, yet ambiguous 
to interpret. Even though the management field has shown some adversity toward 
experimentation (see Colquitt, 2008; Highhouse, 2009), our review has also underlined that 
experiments in management studies are generally neither especially rigorous, nor especially 
generalizable. Thus, it remains unclear whether the skepticism towards experimentation is a 
cause or an effect of this occurrence.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5. QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL TECHNIQUES: A QUEST FOR RELEVANCE AND 
RIGOR WHEN EXPERIMENTAL TOOLS ARE UNAVAILABLE 
Our review and results call for a strong complementarity (and not substitutability) 
between field evidence and laboratory experiments. However, applying the best practices of 
experimentation we have outlined in our article might be impracticable in some naturalistic OM-
relevant settings (e.g., real organizations). Business problems are often ill-defined and practical, 
financial and/or ethical issues make it hard to randomly allocate entities, whether people, groups, 
or organizations to different conditions and managers might be reluctant to apply experimental 
methods in their own teams (e.g., Eden, 2017; Grant & Wall, 2009). So, how should researchers 
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proceed if they encounter an interesting research environment, but randomized field experiments 
are out of the question?  
In this section, we outline several quantitative methods, which are relatively unused in 
OM and which are equipped to produce pragmatic and rigorous research in real business settings. 
These approaches do not require randomization and, under some stringent assumptions, allow 
making strong causal claims even in small sample conditions: (a) the Difference-in-Differences 
design, (b) the Regression Discontinuity design, and (c) the Synthetic Control Method. Our intent 
is not to provide an extensive exposé of those methods; rather, we showcase the intuition behind 
them, discuss when their identification assumptions are likely to be met, and point readers toward 
more in-depth resources. We finally link these approaches to methodological frameworks that are 
more common in OM and management research, showing their possible complementarities. 
5.1. Difference-in-Differences 
In situations where randomization is not feasible, we can exploit both within- and 
between-entity variability through the Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimator. The intuition of 
this method mimics the logic of randomized experiments. The researcher compares the historical 
outcome of two similar entities (e.g., two divisions of a single firm) in two distinct periods. In the 
first period, no unit is exposed to a treatment, whereas in the second period only one entity is 
treated. Given that the two entities are not randomly allocated, a simple comparison of their 
outcomes in the second period might lead to a spurious treatment effect, because other 
differences between the units may be driving the effect. 
The DD estimate circumvents this problem by measuring any pre-existing difference 
between the two untreated entities assessed in the first time period, as well as the variation of the 
outcome over time that would have been observed even without the intervention (see the classic 
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example of Card & Krueger, 1994). If the time differences between groups are stable, then any 
observed difference in the time trends after the intervention is most likely due to the treatment 
(for a brief introduction to DD, see section 4.4 of Antonakis et al., 2010). In addition, two 
assumptions are needed for the DD estimator to be consistent and for the inference to be correct: 
(a) exogenous treatment, (b) cluster-robust inference (for details on the DD estimator, see Angrist 
& Pischke, 2008; Bertrand et al., 2004). 
For an example of how OM scholars can apply the DD framework, let us assume a 
researcher would like to estimate the causal effect of a change in some processes of a company. 
Supposing the researcher is able to find a company with at least two similar plants, she would 
need to convince the firm’s management to adopt the treatment in one plant and to leave the 
second plant untouched. If the time trends in performance across plants are relatively constant 
prior to the intervention, the researcher can measure the performance before and after the 
intervention, both for the treated plant and for the control one to estimate the treatment effect. If 
the researcher can assume that any difference between the treatment and the control plan would 
remain stable over time without the intervention, partialling out the first difference will allow the 
researcher to isolate all time-related confounds and to focus only on the treatment effect.  
Clearly, the larger the between (as well as the within) sample size, the more credible is the 
DD causal effect. However, DD requires—at minimum—two entities: One control and one 
treated group, and of course, observations over time. Still, the validity of DD hinges on the 
constant time-trend assumption, which is credible if treated and untreated entities are similar 
(e.g., two plants or two sub-units of the same firm) and face comparable environments (e.g., same 
market conditions). The same presumption might not hold if the treated and non-treated entities 
are more heterogeneous (e.g., units located in different continents might not follow the same time 
trend). Also, researchers should carefully consider the possibility of spillover effects across 
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studied entities, which is especially likely if treated and non-treated units are somehow connected 
(e.g., communication between managers or workers in geographically close plants). 
5.2. Regression Discontinuity Design 
Let us assume a researcher wants to study the relationship between socially responsible 
procurement and financial performance of corporations. This question is especially interesting for 
OM, where scholars have started to integrate sustainability in their framework (Kleindorfer, 
Singhal, & Wassenhove, 2005; Linton, Klassen, & Jayaraman, 2007). Ideally, one would like to 
run field experiments that randomly allocate many corporations to different procurement policies, 
but such studies are most likely infeasible for logistical reasons. In such situations, a Regression 
Discontinuity Design (RDD) provides an attractive alternative. In RDD setups, the treatment is 
not assigned randomly. Instead, an assignment variable deterministically allocates some units to a 
natural treatment group according to a pre-specified threshold, either in time, space, or some 
descriptive variable (e.g., Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Lee & Lemieux, 2010). For instance, 
Flammer (2015) uses this logic and contrasts the performance of firms in which a proposal 
related to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) was either passed or failed with a small margin 
in shareholder meetings. The intuition is that treated and untreated units (i.e., companies that 
either adopted or opposed the CSR proposal by a handful of votes) can be considered comparable 
and as if randomized, because the board members have—individually—little to no control over 
the assignment variable. As a result, the researcher does not need to model the selection into 
treatment and “close call” votes can generate random variation around the cutoff, that is, at 50% 
vote share (for a recent example and the types of robustness checks to conduct see also Arvate, 
Galilea, & Todescat, 2018). Using close-call elections in one way to model a RD. There are, 
however, many ways in which RDD can be implemented by using premeasured assignment 
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variables in time and space, or even truly exogenous shocks (for ideas, see Bastardoz, Jacquart, & 
Antonakis, 2017). 
5.3. Synthetic control method 
Consider the case where a researcher is interested in studying the effect of a specific 
quality-control program on the output quality of a given product. A plant in a large corporation 
(plant A) has implemented a new quality-control program (i.e., our “treatment”), whereas all 
other plants of the same group still employ the old quality-control policy. However, the 
researcher is unable to employ a DD design, because the data referring to plant A before the 
implementation of the new quality-control program are unavailable. RDD cannot be used, either, 
because there is no assignment variable that allocated different plants to different programs. In 
other words, the researcher has just no chance of observing an actual counterfactual. 
A last resort for estimating causal effects in small n-size contexts is the so-called 
Synthetic Control Method (Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller, 2010, 2011, 2015). Without using 
instrumental variable techniques (cf. Angrist & Pischke, 2008), the work of Abadie and 
colleagues addresses the counterfactual problem by allowing researchers to build their own 
“synthetic” (i.e., simulated) counterfactual. Applied to our example, the intuition of the Synthetic 
Control Method is to use plant A as the treated unit and employ a matching algorithm to create a 
mock plant A that is constructed as a weighted average of all plants that were not treated. More 
specifically, the Synthetic Control Method will approximate the output quality of plant A, had it 
not experienced the treatment (i.e., the quality-control program). Confronting the dynamics of the 
outcome for the treated and the synthetic entity allows estimating the causal effect of the adoption 
of the quality-control program. To further check the validity of the method, the researcher can 
then execute some “placebo tests,” simulating the introduction of the treatment either before or 
50 
 
 
after the actual adoption of the quality-control program or assigning the treatment to plants where 
it was never actually introduced. If the synthetic counterfactual is well-constructed, these placebo 
simulations should not identify a statistical effect of the simulated treatments. On the contrary, a 
large placebo effect would suggest that important differences between actual and synthetic units 
can be triggered by noise: Thus, any observed treatment effect is likely unreliable. 
5.4. From explanation to exploration: Design Science and case studies  
The aforementioned quasi-experimental methods, which are useful for providing causal 
explanations, are rather rare in the OM literature: A search on Web Of Knowledge in autumn 
2018 revealed that only 7 articles in the reviewed OM journals have ever reported either in their 
abstracts or in their keywords the terms “Regression Discontinuity” (0 occurrences), “Difference 
in differences” or “Diff-in-diff” (4 occurrences), “quasi experiment*” (3 occurrences) or 
“Synthetic control method” (0 occurrences)10. We hope these methods will receive more attention 
in the near future, because they allow for solid causal claims on the basis of a rigorous 
quantitative framework using the counterfactual logic (Rubin, 1974). These methods can also 
provide fruitful avenues to complement other frameworks already present in OM: Design Science 
and case study research. 
The Design Science (DS) paradigm is an approach with roots in engineering; here, 
technically complex problems are studied, where engineers have complete control over the 
environment and can alter one element of the process at will (note, in the engineering context a 
pre-post statistical test can estimate the causal effect of the intervention on the process). The DS 
paradigm has also been applied to OM and other disciplines to tackle the theory-practice gap 
(Holmström et al., 2009; Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, & Chatterjee, 2007; Van Aken, 2005; 
                                                 
10For Management Science, we only considered the Operations Management division, as well as articles reporting no specific 
division. We further excluded articles that mentioned any of the keywords, yet did not engage in a quasi-experimental empirical 
analysis. 
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Van Aken, Chandrasekaran, & Halman, 2016; Von Alan, March, Park, & Ram, 2004). However, 
using a DS logic in a complex microeconomic system that is dynamic and includes human 
players brings complications and internal validity confounds that typically render causal 
interpretations impossible. In contrast to traditional experimental approaches, which develop 
interrelated hypotheses and test them via some statistically rigorous method with the objective of 
predicting and/or explaining a phenomenon, the DS paradigm is therefore rather suitable to 
uncover hypotheses about effects of interventions on organizational performance in a particular 
environment (Von Alan et al., 2004). DS focuses on the practical usefulness of a treatment and 
tends to favor proximity to reality (Van Aken et al., 2016; Von Alan et al., 2004). The logic 
behind this approach is to study a process, intervene, and then observe the effect of the 
intervention (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004; Holmström et al., 2009).  
DS may be appropriate for ill-defined research questions, where context-relevant 
knowledge must be collected and analyzed to explore novel solutions to newly-formalized 
business problems. Thus, DS research and experiments serve two different purposes; yet they can 
be complementary: A DS approach can help to formalize the problem and provide an initial 
policy suggestion; experimentation aims at formally testing the causal impact of the policy. 
To simply demonstrate the point, suppose the business objective of a publisher is to 
increase the subscriptions to a journal. A DS study might reveal that a change in editorship (i.e., 
the appointment of a more qualified and renowned person) is followed by an increase in the 
journal’s impact factor a few years later. This observation gives rise to the hypothesis that the 
quality of the editor affects the impact factor. To empirically establish a causal link, however, 
counterfactual thinking becomes key, because alternative explanations need to be excluded. For 
example, the increase in the impact factor could also be a field specific effect (e.g., more journals 
in that field were indexed in the Web of Science that year) or it could be a general effect (e.g., 
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citation inflation). In this particular case, a direct experiment is difficult to implement, but the 
quasi-experimental approaches discussed above (e.g. a “diff-in-diff” design that uses comparable 
journals as a control group) could be applied. That is, we can compare the difference in outcomes 
in an entity from before and after a DS intervention relative to an entity receiving no intervention; 
doing so would result in a difference-in-differences estimator and thus allow for causal claims to 
be made. 
Quasi-experimentation also retains some of the virtues of case study research with respect 
to focusing on a fine-grained and in-depth understanding of the dynamics at play in a specific 
situation (Meredith, 1998). Being especially “close to the action”, the case study logic is helpful 
to formalize new research questions and hypotheses. However, when it comes to causality, 
experimentation is superior to “snapshot” case studies, because focusing on a single case might 
lead to sampling on the dependent variable (i.e., to employ a criterion—like exceptional 
performance—to select a case, and then study the antecedents and consequences of the criterion, 
failing to study all entities that do not meet the criterion itself). Quasi-experimental techniques 
are comparable to existing case study frameworks for generating counterfactuals (see, e.g., "polar 
opposites" and "experimental template for case study research", Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Gerring & McDermott, 2007), which makes them closer also to the experience of qualitative 
researchers. Yet again, with observations over time, quantification, and a strong counterfactual, 
one can easily extend this paradigm to make causal claims. 
Overall, we are confident that the quasi-experimental methods we introduced earlier can 
be very useful complements to the current toolkit of OM and other social sciences too, given that 
these methods are applicable in small n–size design conditions. Quasi-experimentation represents 
a causally solid approach for evaluating artifacts’ performance (Mettler, Eurich, & Winter, 2014), 
yet ensures a logistically simpler alternative to field-experimentation. Obviously, these methods 
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still present some logistical challenges compared to less obtrusive—though less internally valid—
observational research methods. Still, researchers should consider choosing from a more 
complete menu of identification strategies that can exploit either non-randomized interventions or 
naturally-occurring variations. 
6. DISCUSSION 
Our review and our empirical results underline significant margins of improvement 
regarding experimental methods in several social sciences. In particular, management disciplines 
seem to lag behind best practice in statistical analysis of experimental data and in some 
dimensions of internal validity (e.g., demand effects, non-consequential studies and 
incentivization of decisions) and potential generalizability (e.g., paucity of field 
experimentation). After having presented a series of recommendations on how to make an 
experimental study rigorous, more generalizable, and relevant for practice, our empirical analysis 
has revealed that the advice we promulgated is rather wide-ranging and helps, not hurts, an article 
in the academic marketplace for citations. That is, across different fields, the markers of internal 
validity and external/ecological validity we recommended positively and significantly predict 
citations received by experimental articles. Publishing well-done experimental research benefits 
journals and rewards authors. 
Some of our recommendations are similar to the ones already presented in manuals and 
reviews of experimental method both in OM (e.g., Katok, 2011) and other disciplines (e.g., Duflo 
et al., 2007; Gerber & Green, 2008; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). However, our unique 
contribution is to cover the most disparate aspects about experimental design, analysis, and 
interpretation and to find a balance between multiple approaches and needs coming from the 
different “methodological histories” of experimental OM (mainly psychology and economics). 
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Another distinctive characteristic of our article is the measurement the state of different academic 
fields vis-à-vis the methodological guidelines we propose. 
Overall, our arguments suggest that methodological rigor and research relevance are 
complementary rather than substitutes. Rigor is an obvious antecedent of generalizability and 
practical relevance (Highhouse, 2009): Research with low internal validity misrepresents reality 
and is neither generalizable, nor useful (Antonakis, 2017; Gulati, 2007; Vermeulen, 2005). Next, 
some of the most important markers of internal validity that we have reviewed in this article are 
beneficial—and not antithetic—to experimental realism and generalizability. For instance, 
consequential decision environments are as important for achieving control in experimental 
settings as they are crucial for increasing the psychological realism and the subjects’ immersion 
in the experimental environment. 
However, the results of our study bring to the fore an important question: Given that, on 
average, good methodological practice is generally rewarded in the citation market, why do we 
sometimes observe a gap between current experimental work and our methodological 
suggestions? We can only speculate, yet it is likely that experimental research that does not 
comply with our guidelines is logistically simpler to conduct, less time-consuming and, 
ultimately, economically convenient. For instance, running non-consequential vignette 
experiments directly in the class where the experimenter teaches is faster and cheaper than 
organizing an incentivized experiment with real participant interaction. To this extent, researchers 
might find more profitable to produce more but lower-quality studies. Similar, using deception 
out of convenience makes running experiments quite easy. However, such a state of affairs is 
unfortunate and we urge the publication system gatekeepers to adopt stricter evaluation criteria in 
this regard because in doing so both relevance and rigor will improve. Also, reorganization of 
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doctoral training in experimental methods is required (cf. Aiken, West, & Millsap, 2008; 
Antonakis et al., 2010). 
6.1. The ten commandments of experimental research  
We synthetize our recommendations below and trust that they can serve as a useful guide 
for authors; the below is summarized in Table 6: 
I. Rigor is the sine qua non of experimental research: Research that is not rigorous cannot be 
relevant, not even in vocationally oriented academic fields. 
II. When deciding about the appropriate type of experiment, use laboratory experiments 
for tightly controlled theory testing and detailed analysis of causal mechanisms; prefer 
field experiments if effect sizes within a particular population or context are of central 
interest. Laboratory experiments provide tight control; however, to be internally valid, they 
must be consequential and avoid demand effects. Moreover, they are mostly suitable for 
individual- or group-level phenomena (having real-world behavioral, attitudinal, and 
decisional analogs). Field experiments, contrarily, allow establishing the magnitude and the 
generalizability of an effect size in naturalistic conditions and in the population of interest. As 
a general rule, empirical settings that can be simplified to a single type of decision (i.e., 
newsvendor quantities, auction-pricing) can be most appropriately first explored with 
laboratory experiments, particularly with regards to directionality and biases, whereas more 
context-specific decisions are best studied in the field. 
III. Experimental demand effects must not correlate with the treatment (i.e., they must be 
constant across treatments); specify an appropriate baseline to cleanly estimate the 
treatment effect. Researchers should always construct a control group (i.e., baseline 
condition) representing a neutral level of the manipulated variable and of the related demand 
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characteristics; if possible they should also manipulate levels of the focal variable. Comparing 
only two treatments with opposite expected effects (i.e., a “medicine” and a “poison”) does 
not identify which condition causes the observed effect and generates unfair comparisons. 
IV. Avoid hypothetical experiments (e.g., vignettes, conditional-choice type experiments) 
that are not consequential and are prone to demand effects. Non-consequential, or self-
reported assessments may be appropriate if the dependent variable of interest is an emotion or 
a perception. However, when it comes to studying behavior, such experiments are on the 
lowest rung of experimental evidence; they may represent a preliminary indication of the 
validity of a theory only if purged from demand effects. 
V. Use manipulation checks carefully and parsimoniously to minimize the risk of demand 
effects. Manipulation checks should be always conducted after the measurement of the main 
experimental outcome and, ideally, be run on a separate—yet comparable—sample. Also, 
manipulation checks are meaningless—they are just “remembering checks”—when 
manipulations are non-consequential or solely demand-driven. 
VI. Avoid deceiving participants, particularly in laboratories. Researchers should never 
misrepresent an experimental situation; deception should be used very sparingly and only as a 
last resort. Obfuscation or concealing the real purpose of the experiment, as well as some 
details of the design is permitted. In field experiments the use of deception might be 
appropriate if subject pool contamination is very unlikely and practical restrictions prohibit 
the use of non-deceptive solutions.  
VII. Guard against endogeneity by eliminating confounds via design or estimation where 
possible. Simple comparisons of treatment means and plots of the row data are often 
sufficient to analyze experimental results. However, the required countermeasures should be 
57 
 
 
taken when modeling endogenous mediators, lagged dependent variables, or when there is 
serial correlation, failed randomization, or imperfect compliance to treatment. 
VIII. Ensure a sufficient sample size per cell for proper randomization of treatments to 
participants. Use of within-session randomization is recommended whenever possible. If 
sessions have to be separated by treatment, it is crucial to minimize the risk of session effects 
by balanced randomization. Small sample sizes (i.e., n < 50) need to be avoided if possible. If 
external factors impose a small sample, it is important to establish ex-ante comparability of 
treatment groups and to use control variables in regressions. 
IX. The sample used must match the research question that will be answered. Student 
participants are readily available and have the intellectual capacity to understand complex 
instructions. These characteristics make them ideal for initial theory tests and the 
establishment of general behavioral, attitudinal, and decisional mechanisms. EMBA students 
or employees can be a useful first step to test the practical relevance of a finding without 
giving up to the advantages of the laboratory. 
X. Use an appropriate quasi-experimental technique if field-experimentation is impossible. 
Regression Discontinuity Design, Difference-in-Differences, and the Synthetic Control 
Method could be used more frequently to exploit premeasured assignment variables (either 
naturally occurring or implemented with the collaboration of a firm). They are less obtrusive 
than field experiments, yet mimic experimental control when key assumptions are met. 
Each of our guidelines is self-standing, yet our “ten commandments” are also deeply 
interrelated. Together, they sketch a methodological protocol that can help to standardize the 
empirical practice in especially multidisciplinary fields and foster communication among 
experimentalists who come from different fields. Also, a common empirical framework can 
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support a fruitful scientific cycle, whereby laboratory and field experimentation complement each 
other and, together with quasi-experiments, represent a powerful tool to test and amend existing 
theories. 
[Insert Table 6 about here]  
6.2. Limitations 
Finally, there are some limitations that should temper some of our results. Given space 
constraints, we have only treated a fraction of all possible topics pertaining to experimental 
methods. For instance, we did not discuss the novel opportunities and risks related to the 
emergence of electronic marketplaces (e.g., Amazon mTurk), which are now a common tool for 
many experimental researchers (Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011). Similarly, we have not 
discussed some of the limits related to field experimentation (Eden, 2017), or advanced design 
and statistical issues (e.g., multiple hypotheses testing corrections, List, Shaikh, & Xu, 2016); 
discussing pre-analysis plans would have been very useful too (e.g., Olken, 2015). 
As for our results, first, the information we extracted from the reviewed articles was 
manually coded and is based on a limited subset of articles; it also required several judgement 
calls. Next, our results are descriptive; what causes the differences we observe across disciplines 
as well as what causally drives citations is not clear. We leave to future research the objective of 
enlarging the scope of our quantitative review and of exploring more thoroughly the causality 
matter. Similarly, we hope future inquiries will build on our work and will review more advanced 
methodological topics related to experimentation. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The epigraph at the beginning of our article nicely captures the need for experimental 
observation. Of course, experiments must be well done and they are not a panacea. The infamous 
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experiments that suggested neutrinos travelled faster than the speed of light were even replicated; 
yet, so contrary were these results to theory that most physicists did not believe them. Faulty 
cabling and measurement finally explained the mishap (Reich, 2012). Similarly, Jacques 
Benveniste destroyed his career by publishing an article in Nature that initially looked well done 
and experimentally demonstrated that homeopathic preparations had effects. However, these 
results violated the laws of chemistry and a tightly controlled experiment showed Benveniste’s 
team fell prey to experimenter expectation effects because of a lax experimenter blinding 
protocol (Maddox, Randi, & Stewart, 1988). Given the respect scientists have for the 
experimental method, it is easy to see how specious experimental results might lead researchers 
down the garden path. Thus, we cannot restate enough times that rigor is the sine qua non of all 
research including experimental research.  
Experiments are becoming mainstream. Several academic fields that had been historically 
averse to experimental methods like finance and financial accounting (Haigh & List, 2005; 
Libby, Bloomfield, & Nelson, 2002), political science (McDermott, 2002), and even archeology 
(Outram, 2008) are now embracing them. Experiments represent a great opportunity for 
advancing scientific knowledge, as well as lay down an important methodological challenge: 
Because experimental evidence should be the final judge for the validity of our theories, we have 
an intellectual obligation to employ the best possible experimental methods. 
In this article, we have discussed how to make experimental research in operations 
management—and in the social sciences more in general—valid, realistic, and relevant for 
practice. Our theories must rest on solid empirical grounds; the practice and the science of 
management demand cutting-edge methods to solve the challenges facing our rapidly changing 
society. We are confident that experimentation—if rigorously conducted—represents an 
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important method for discovering new knowledge and for ultimately testing and contributing to 
the developing of new theory. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1. Citations distribution (retrieved from Scopus in September 2017). 
 
  
 
The x-axis refers to the total number of citations received by an article; the y-axis refers to the 
number of articles in the sample that exhibit a given number of total citations. Panel A (n = 258, 
mean = 38.37, sd = 52.16, min = 0, max = 275, proportion of 0 citation = 6.20%) shows the 
overall distribution for the entire sample, whereas Panel B (n = 111, mean = 21.68, sd = 26.45, 
min = 0, max = 116, proportion of 0 citations = 7.21%) reports the citation distribution for the 
OM field. 
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Figure 2. Effect of validity markers on citations. 
 
Average marginal effect of each internal, statistical and external/ecological validity marker on 
the citations received by the experimental articles in our sample (based on the regression in 
column (1), Table 4, with 95% confidence intervals). The graph depicts the average discrete 
effect of each binary validity indicator on the average total citations received by an article. 
The last estimate is the overall effect using a linear combination of estimators. External 
validity indicators (marked by *) are reverse-coded, in order to interpret the average effect as 
the consequence of not employing working adults samples, EMBA samples, or field 
experiments. 
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Table 1. The major internal and statistical validity threats in experimental research. 
 
Internal validity threats 
 
Name Explanation 
Unfair comparisons and demand 
effects 
 Social desirability and experimenter effects. 
 Asymmetric demands between treatment and control 
group (e.g., missing placebo group and “medicine vs 
poison” treatment comparison). 
Non-consequential decision 
environments 
 No linkage between actions made and consequences 
faced by an experimental subject. 
 Absence of extrinsic motivators. 
 In case of absence of formal extrinsic motivators, 
lack of any form of intrinsic motivator. 
Deception  Misrepresentation of important elements of the 
experimental setting (especially problematic in 
laboratory experiments). 
Manipulation checks before the 
assessment of dependent 
variable 
 
 They induce demand effects, because they make 
salient the purpose of the experiment in the eyes of 
participants. 
 
Statistical validity threats 
 
Name Explanation 
Incorrect inference  Lack of cluster-robust standard errors when data are 
hierarchically clustered. 
Failed randomization  Unbalanced allocation of covariates across 
treatments due to small sample size (i.e., if n < 50 
per experimental cell, see the results of our Monte 
Carlo simulation in Appendix; for similar 
suggestions, see also Simmons et al., 2013). 
Lagged dependent variable, 
endogenous mediator and local 
non-identification 
 Endogeneity triggered by the autocorrelated error 
term. 
 Mediator and outcome variable both depend on an 
unobserved variable. 
 Instrumental variable estimator requires at least one 
instrument, excluded from the y equation, per 
endogenous mediator. 
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Non-compliance to treatment  Excluding non-compliers.  
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Table 2. Internal and statistical validity across fields. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
No 
compensatio
n/incentive 
Manipulatio
n check 
before DV 
Demand 
effect Deception 
Non-
consequenti
al study 
Incorrect 
estimation 
Incorrect 
inference 
Small sample 
(n < 50) 
                 
OM Econ.
 
.17*** .01 -.04 .06 -.07 .12 .17** .36*** 
 (.06) (.02) (.09) (.05) (.08) (.07) (.09) (.10) 
OM Non-econ.
 
.42*** .03 .26** .06 .25** .16** -.05 .20* 
 (.09) (.04) (.12) (.05) (.12) (.08) (.07) (.11) 
Management .15* .14** .37*** .21*** .50*** .17** -.06 .36*** 
 (.08) (.06) (.11) (.07) (.10) (.07) (.07) (.11) 
Psychology .35*** .04 .45*** .30*** .56*** .15** -.10* .32*** 
 (.09) (.03) (.11) (.08) (.09) (.07) (.05) (.10) 
Constant -.03 -.01 .17** -.03 .19*** .02 .15*** .13* 
 (.04) (.01) (.08) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.05) (.08) 
 
        R-squared .18 .12 .38 .31 .51 .11 .14 .36 
Coders FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pub. Year Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bib. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F statistic 3.78
***
 .69 15.80
***
 2.16
***
 36.40 1.55
*
 2.10
***
 10.99
***
 
Difference (a-b) ** ns *** ns *** ns *** ns 
n = 468 experimental studies; Clustered standard errors in parentheses (article-level); ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .10, ns: p > .10 
Omitted category is economics. The distinction between OM Economics-based and OM non-Economics-based was a coded category 
(observed inter-coder agreement on this variable was 90%). All regressions include bibliographical controls (journal impact factor, 
number of experimental studies in each article, number of authors, number of references, sum of authors’ citation until publication 
date, sum of authors’ articles until publication date, average ranking of the authors’ universities), coder fixed effects and publication-
year fixed effects. All covariates and fixed-effects are mean-centered. The row “Difference (a-b)” refers to the test for the difference of 
the coefficients of OM Economics-based and OM Non-Economics-based (F(1, 257)). 
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Table 3. External and ecological validity across fields. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Working  
adults 
Grad/EMBA 
students 
Field 
experiment 
       
OM Econ.
a 
.00 .04 -.39*** 
 
(.05) (.03) (.09) 
OM Non-econ.
b 
.18** .15*** -.35*** 
 
(.07) (.06) (.09) 
Management .05 .10** -.35*** 
 
(.07) (.05) (.09) 
Psychology -.02 .05** -.42*** 
 
(.04 (.03) (.09) 
Constant .05 -.03 .43*** 
 
(.04) (.02) (.08) 
 
   
R-squared .16 .13 .26 
Coders Fes Yes Yes Yes 
Pub. Year Fes Yes Yes Yes 
Bib. Controls Yes Yes Yes 
F statistic 1.49
*
 .85 2.41
***
 
Difference (a-b) *** ** ns 
 
n = 468 experimental studies; Clustered standard errors in parentheses (article-level); ***p < .01, 
**p < .05, *p < .10, ns: p > .10. 
Omitted category is Economics. The distinction between OM Economics-based and OM non-
Economics-based was a coded category (observed inter-coder agreement on this variable was 
90%). All regressions include bibliographical controls (journal impact factor, number of 
experimental studies in each article, number of authors, number of references, sum of authors’ 
citation until publication date, sum of authors’ articles until publication date, average ranking of 
the authors’ universities), coder fixed effects and publication-year fixed effects. All covariates 
and fixed-effects are mean-centered. 
a,bThe row “Difference (a-b)” refers to the test for the 
difference of the coefficients of OM Economics-based and OM Non-Economics-based (F(1, 
257)). 
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Table 4. Citation analysis. 
  Article citations 
 
All fields All fields 
Operati
ons Econ. Mngt Psych. 
             
5-year impact factor 
 
.11*** .04 -.06 .17*** .15** 
  
(.03) (.05) (.08) (.04) (.08) 
Article age .79*** .74*** .97*** .79*** .81*** 1.03*** 
 (.08) (.08) (.12) (.16) (.11) (.21) 
Article age squared -.04*** -.03*** -.05*** -.04*** -.04*** -.05*** 
 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) 
Number of authors .08 .08 .10 .28** -.05 .09 
 (.05) (.05) (.13) (.13) (.08) (.08) 
Number of studies -.01 .01 .12 -.48*** -.28** .08 
 (.06) (.06) (.09) (.15) (.12) (.11) 
No. refs .81*** .62*** .30 .41 1.15*** .91** 
 (.19) (.20) (.34) (.42) (.41) (.42) 
Authors’ citationsa .01 .01* -.01 -.00 .01* .01 
 (.00) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) 
No articles team
a
  -.12 -.13 -.04 -.19 -.35 -.29 
 (.10) (.10) (.12) (.91) (.64) (1.06) 
Team ave. uni. Rank .05 .07* .05 .30*** -.13** .28*** 
 (.04) (.04) (.04) (.09) (.06) (.07) 
No incentive
+ 
-.42*** -.43*** -.63***  -.54** -.47* 
 (.14) (.15) (.21)  (.24) (.27) 
Demand effect
+
 -.23* -.31** .01 -.82** -.19 -.20 
 (.12) (.13) (.23) (.40) (.17) (.19) 
Non-consequential
+
 .16 .15 .09 .39 .30 .39* 
 (.15) (.17) (.34) (.46) (.25) (.21) 
Deception
+
 -.02 -.00 .29 -.05 .00 -.34 
 (.15) (.14) (.28) (.31) (.25) (.21) 
Manip. Check before DV
+
 -.04 .04 -.03  .01 1.09* 
 (.27) (.32) (.37)  (.15) (.59) 
Working adults
+
 .22 .08 .31 .34 .25* .04 
 (.14) (.15) (.26) (.46) (.14) (.30) 
Grad/EMBA students
+
 .14 .09 -.16  .47  
 (.23) (.24) (.27)  (.29)  
Field experiment
+
 .34* .32* .42 .40 .67  
 (.18) (.19) (.31) (.28) (.41)  
Incorrect estimation
+
 .24 .11 .51* .18 -.32** -.48* 
 (.16) (.14) (.27) (.57) (.16) (.25) 
Incorrect inference
+
 -.12 -.15 -.14 .38 -.43 -.47 
 (.15) (.15) (.18) (.30) (.28) (.42) 
Small sample
+
 (n < 50) -.01 .02 -.33* .87*** .45 .34 
 (.13) (.14) (.19) (.27) (.32) (.22) 
Only diff.-in-means -.03 -.11 .16 -.34 -.17 -.18 
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 (.12) (.13) (.19) (.42) (.57) (.18) 
Constant -.11 -.90** -.87 -1.10 -1.26 -3.44*** 
 (.43) (.46) (.63) (1.07) (.89) (.96) 
Ave. of validity markers -.10
**
 -.10
*
 -.07 .02 -.19
***
 -.02 
              
Observations (studies) 468 468 162 60 87 159 
Coders FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Publication year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Journal FE Yes No No No No No 
Field FE No Yes No No No No 
Pseudo R2 .15 .13 .14 .14 .23 .16 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (article-level). 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10 
Negative binomial regression results (over-dispersion parameter ln 𝛼 always significant at the 1% 
level). Bibliographical controls include: article age, article age squared, number of authors, 
number of studies, number of references reported by each article, citations received by the team 
of authors, articles published by the team of authors, and average ranking of the authors’ 
universities of affiliation. Authors’ citations, articles published, ranking of the university and 
number of references reported by the coded article are divided by 100. The beta coefficients 
reported represent the difference in the logs of predicted citations, holding constant all other 
variables. Average effect of validity markers = linear combination of the coefficients of internal, 
external, and statistical validity markers highlighted with the symbol 
+
 (with external validity 
makers reverse-coded, to interpret the average effect as the consequence of not following our 
methodological suggestions).
a
till publication date;  
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Table 5. Predicted Vs actual citations. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Field 
Predicted 
citations 
Predicted 
citations 
per year (5 
years) 
Median IF 
of journals 
in field  
5-year IF 
of reviewed 
journals 
% diff (3) 
to (1) 
% diff (4) 
to (2) 
OM 2.79 6.43 1.49 4.44 +87% +44%
+
 
Economics 3.06 7.06 .93 6.35 +229%
**
 +11% 
Management 1.79 4.13 1.72 9.17 +4% -55%
***
 
Psychology 2.85 6.56 
2.13
a 
5.13 
+34% 
+28% 
1.62
b 
+76% 
a
Psychology; 
b
Psychology-Social 
Asterisk refer to χ2(1) test with Bonferroni correction for testing multiple hypotheses 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01, 
+
p = .10 
Median impact factor data refer to JCR Year 2016; 5-year impact factor is computed as the mean 
at the academic field level of the impact factors of the journals reviewed in our article. 
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Table 6. The “ten commandments” of experimental research 
 
I. Rigor: Rigor is the sine qua non of experimental research; relevance follows. 
II. Laboratory vs field experiments: Use laboratory experiments for controlled theory 
testing of real-world analogs; prefer field experiments to estimate the statistical effect for 
a particular population and context. 
III. Demand effects and baselines: Hold experimental demand characteristics constant 
across treatments and clearly specify a baseline condition. 
IV. Vignette studies: Avoid experiments with hypothetical choices. 
V. Manipulation checks: Use manipulation checks carefully and parsimoniously. 
VI. Deception: Avoid deceiving participants; obfuscation is allowed. 
VII. Endogeneity: Guard against omitted variables and noncompliance. 
VIII. Randomization: Ensure an appropriate sample size per experimental cell for covariate 
balance (n > 50 per cell).
1
 
IX. Sample composition: Match the right sample to the right research question. 
Undergraduate student samples are legitimate samples to use. 
X. Quasi-experimentation: Use appropriate non-experimental identification techniques if 
field-experimentation is impossible. 
 
Note: 
1
We wish to stress that what determines an appropriate sample size is very context specific.  
The above threshold is purely indicative and based on a series of simulations that consider only a 
fraction of all possible empirical scenarios (see Appendix A.3). Throughout all simulations, we 
only studied the distribution of dichotomous covariates (both orthogonal and correlated) 
randomized into two balanced experimental conditions. Also, the n > 50 threshold was 
constructed only with reference to the issue of failed randomization: Clearly, employing the same 
rule of thumb will not necessarily ensure sufficient statistical power of an experiment. Thus, 
researchers should always be wary of any rules of thumb and should take great care to justify 
their sample size on the basis of field-specific criteria. 
